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CONTRACTUAL INEQUALITY
Manisha Padi*
Most individuals strive to satisfy every obligation laid out in standard form
contracts such as mortgages, insurance plans, or credit agreements. Sophisticated parties, however, adapt and modify their obligations during contract
performance by negotiating for lenient treatment and taking advantage of unclear terms. The common law explicitly authorizes variance from standardized
contract terms during performance. When the same standard terms create
value for sophisticated individuals and destroy value for others, the result is
contractual inequality. Contractual inequality has grown without scrutiny by
courts or scholars, enabling regressive redistribution of resources and creating
economic inefficiency by sowing distrust in markets for consumer contracts.
To document the magnitude of contractual inequality, this Article provides
novel empirical evidence from a case study of residential mortgage contracts.
Data from a large nationwide sample show that many mortgage servicers
choose not to utilize their power to foreclose on a borrower in default, with
more than one-third of nonpaying borrowers avoiding foreclosure. Servicers
disproportionately foreclose on borrowers in poor neighborhoods, regressively
redistributing over $500 million in wealth to high-income communities each
year. Moreover, servicers’ unfettered freedom to choose who undergoes foreclosure may have reduced the value of mortgages to consumers, increasing market
inefficiency.
Courts and regulators need not turn a blind eye to contractual inequality, allowing private market forces to determine the exercise of contract rights. This
Article argues that lawmakers should gather information about inequalities in
contract performance and disseminate such data to private and public enforcement authorities. By bringing these inequalities to light, lawmakers can take a
first step toward more efficient contract markets and a more equal society.
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INTRODUCTION
Standard form contracts impose equality in contract terms across transactions. 1 All mortgage instruments, for instance, borrow their terms from the
same federally drafted forms. 2 However, standardization in contract terms

1. See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS,
AND THE RULE OF LAW 9 (2013) (“Standardized form contracts, when they are imposed upon

consumers, have long been called ‘contracts of adhesion,’ or ‘take-it-or-leave-it contracts,’ because the recipient has no choice with regard to the terms.”); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1258 (2003)
(“[I]n contrast to the Platonic ideal of a contract in which all terms are subject to bargaining,
form contracts are usually offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis—perhaps the price is negotiable,
but often even this is not subject to bargaining.”).
2. Most mortgage contracts include the exact same written terms because of “the huge
dominance in the home mortgage market of Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac uniform mortgage instruments.” Julia Patterson Forrester, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Mortgage Instruments:
The Forgotten Benefit to Homeowners, 72 MO. L. REV. 1077, 1079 (2007); see Fannie Mae Legal
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does not mean that all transactions are equal. Despite assenting to the same
terms, different parties may find that contract terms are utilized differently
during performance. 3 The result is that one mortgage borrower may find multiple obligations waived, receiving an easy path to payoff, while a similarly situated borrower may be threatened with legal action at every turn.
This Article develops a theory of inequality in contract performance, rather than inequality in terms offered, across social groups. 4 Differences in performance across identical contracts, termed contractual inequality, have two
implications. 5 First, they may unfairly privilege sophisticated parties and
worsen existing social inequalities. 6 Second, individuals who are considering
entering a new contractual relationship may be deterred by the possibility that
they will be mistreated later during performance, resulting in fewer transactions and inefficient prices. 7 Households rely heavily on standardized consumer contracts to secure housing, pay for expenses, and insure against losses,

Documents (New), FANNIE MAE, https://singlefamily.fanniemae.com/fannie-mae-legal-documents#legal-security-instruments [perma.cc/PQ5G-L9DN].
3. This Article builds a theoretical framework on a growing literature emphasizing the
difference between the “real deal,” which includes adjustments to the contract after formation,
and the “paper deal” in the written contract. A large literature on consumer contracts has discussed
the important role played by discretionary benefits, which are usually provided to the consumer
by a firm wishing to gain a good reputation despite the formal contract terms being significantly
less pro-consumer. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in
Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827 (2006); Lisa Bernstein & Hagay Volvovsky, Not What You Wanted to Know: The Real Deal and the Paper Deal in Consumer Contracts—Comment on the Work of Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, 12 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 128,
131 (2015); Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679.
4. This builds on a literature that has illuminated the difference between contracts as
written and as enforced. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 3; Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z.
Zarsky, Minding the Gap, 51 CONN. L. REV. 69 (2019) (theorizing that firms’ leniency in enforcing consumer contract terms can cause negative consequences for consumers); Meirav FurthMatzkin, Selective Enforcement of Consumer Contracts: Evidence from the Retail Market
(2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (showing that retail
return policies are differentially enforced against different types of customers); Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 864–91 (2006)
(noting that differential enforcement of contract terms against parties with different levels of
sophistication and bargaining power may have regressive distributional consequences).
5. See infra Part II.
6. The primary focus will be on economic inequality, though similar disparities can arise
across dimensions such as race, gender, age, sexuality, country of origin, and religion. Economic
inequality has been growing exponentially in the last fifty years by many metrics. Thomas Piketty
& Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913–1998, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1 (2003)
(beginning the modern literature on inequality by collecting comprehensive quantitative data
on the growth of inequality in income); Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality
in the United States Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data, 131 Q.J. ECON. 519
(2016) (calculating a broad-based definition of wealth and showing the sudden upturn in wealth
inequality starting in the 1980s and continuing to the present day).
7. This phenomenon occurs due to incompleteness of contracting, especially due to the
inability of contracting parties to credibly commit to not modifying the original contract.
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but contractual inequality exposes the most disadvantaged populations to the
highest risk of serious loss. 8
This Article connects fundamental principles of contract law to the
growth in economic inequality. 9 The common law of contracts has traditionally authorized contracting parties to treat social groups differently. 10 As long
as parties satisfy the formal terms of a contract, remaining discretion in contract performance may be used to harm disadvantaged groups and benefit
privileged groups. 11 When the written contract leaves some discretion to the
parties, no contract law cause of action exists to challenge unequal treatment
during performance. 12 Moreover, every consumer contract has some incompleteness, or areas in which contract performance can vary while satisfying
PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY 37–39 (2005); see also Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modification, 26
J. LEGAL STUD. 203 (1997) (explaining that a particular type of incompleteness, the inability to
commit to nonmodifiable contracts, gives rise to welfare loss).
8. Though consumer contracts touch on a wide variety of settings, including employment, services, retail goods, and online transactions that raise privacy concerns, this Article focuses largely on financial contracts. The largest and most significant contracts undertaken by
most households are debt contracts. Household and business indebtedness has grown significantly over the past ten years. See CTR. FOR MICROECONOMIC DATA, FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y.,
QUARTERLY REPORT ON HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND CREDIT (2021), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/data/pdf/HHDC_2021Q3.pdf [perma.cc/ME7F-NH8G];
Joshua Franklin & Kate Duguid, The Decade of Debt: Big Deals, Bigger Risk, REUTERS (Dec. 30,
2019, 1:19 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-markets-decade-credit/the-decadeof-debt-big-deals-bigger-risk-idUSKBN1YY09Y [perma.cc/E2GK-2XF5]; Nonfinancial Corporate Business; Debt Securities and Loans; Liability, Level, FRED, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BCNSDODNS [perma.cc/2Q57-PEPP] (last updated Dec. 9, 2021). Saez and Zucman posit
that main drivers of wealth inequality include a large growth in debt among low- and middleincome households, Saez & Zucman, supra note 6, at 555, joining Mian and Sufi in their argument that households are dangerously overleveraged. ATIF MIAN & AMIR SUFI, HOUSE OF DEBT:
HOW THEY (AND YOU) CAUSED THE GREAT RECESSION, AND HOW WE CAN PREVENT IT FROM
HAPPENING AGAIN (2015).
9. Contract law in this Article refers to the traditional common law of contracts, as well
as the set of commercial laws and assorted state and federal regulations targeting the origination
and performance of formal contracts.
10. See OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT 158–64 (2012) (describing the larger
harms done to more unsophisticated consumers who are more present-biased when faced with
complex contracts intended to take advantage of behavioral biases); Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth
Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 23–25 (2008) (noting that firms with “usepattern information” about their customers can exploit this knowledge about contract performance to extract value from some customers, usually those who are already disadvantaged in
other ways); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Perverse Consequences of Disclosing Standard Terms, 103
CORNELL L. REV. 117 (2017) (suggesting that enhanced disclosure requirements may result in
less consumer understanding of the underlying contract terms); Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers
Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big Retail, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1357–58 (2015) (showing
how big retailers’ sales strategies may result in unequal outcomes across consumers).
11. See Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 3, at 827, 830; Becher & Zarsky, supra note 4, at
77–78; Furth-Matzkin, supra note 4; Johnston, supra note 4, at 859.
12. The law-and-economics literature on embedded options and incomplete contracts
has described contracting parties’ inability to bargain in advance for every possible action taken
by every party in every possible contingency. Traditional contracts always allocate a certain
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formal legal requirements. 13 For instance, parties are free to exercise their reserved discretion, breach their contracts, waive or enforce their counterparties’ obligations, and modify or renegotiate their agreements without oversight
from courts and regulators. 14 Courts and regulators have granted private parties the right to make these discretionary choices but have turned a blind eye
to the use of this power, 15 allowing contractual inequality to grow unchecked.
This Article takes residential mortgage servicing as a case study for
demonstrating the magnitude of contractual inequality. Consider two homeowners who have lost their jobs and cannot make payments on their longterm mortgages. 16 Both are embedded in their local communities and have
children in local public schools. Each calls their mortgage provider and asks
for their lender’s cooperation in helping them keep their home. 17 Though both
homeowners have the same credit score and their mortgages have similar interest rates and monthly payments, their two phone conversations proceed
very differently. The first homeowner is given several options, including a
“loss mitigation” program that can decrease her monthly payments or a shortterm “forbearance” period during which she can temporarily stop payment. 18

amount of discretion to the parties that courts are not expected to “verify” and discipline. Robert
E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract
Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1432–33 (2004) [hereinafter Scott & Triantis, Embedded Options]; Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract
Design, 56 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 187 (2005).
13. A large literature in law and economics on incomplete contracts has noted the significant gaps left in most contracts, but it focuses primarily on courts as gap fillers rather than the
parties themselves. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87, 95 (1989) (proposing an economic
theory of gap filling in incomplete contracts); Omri Ben-Shahar, “Agreeing to Disagree”: Filling
Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 389, 390, 400 (noting that contractual incompleteness can arise in cases of disagreement across parties as well as agreement, meaning that gap filling must avoid exploitation of incompleteness). Exceptions to this include
literature on “self-help remedies” in contract, which explicitly refers to the steps parties can take
within the bounds of the contract terms to protect their interests. See Mark P. Gergen, A Theory
of Self-Help Remedies in Contract, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1397 (2009) (coining the term “self-help remedies” and canvassing prior literature referring to this concept).
14. See infra Section I.B.
15. See Uri Benoliel & Shmuel I. Becher, Termination Without Explanation Contracts,
2022 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022), https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3737774 [perma.cc/99KNYHUN] (describing contracting parties’ sometimes arbitrary and erroneous choices while terminating contracts according to the formal terms).
16. See Natalie Campisi, Mortgage Delinquencies Spike Due to COVID-19: What to Do If
You Can’t Pay Your Loan, FORBES (Aug 18, 2020, 11:05 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/advisor/2020/08/18/mortgage-delinquencies-spike-due-to-covid-19-what-to-do-if-you-cant-payyour-loan [perma.cc/U2CT-NYKM].
17. See How to Negotiate Debts with Your Lenders, EQUIFAX, https://www.equifax.com/personal/education/debt-management/negotiate-debt-with-lenders [perma.cc/3DC8-RWAA].
18. For an overview of mortgage options, see Samuel C. Waters, A View from the Trenches:
The Legal Practitioner and Loss Mitigation, 60 S.C. L. REV. 807 (2009). The Federal Trade Commission provides a guide to individuals facing debt collection in other contexts; the guide notes
that statutory protections against aggressive debt-collection practices typically do not apply to
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The second homeowner, on the other hand, is told that he must pay according
to the terms of the mortgage, and he is advised that foreclosure proceedings
may begin after four months of missed payments. 19 The first homeowner is
ultimately allowed to stay in her home, while the second is forced to remove
his children from school and relocate while saddled with a low credit score. 20
Using a detailed commercial dataset on mortgage performance, this Article shows how common these disparities are and their devastating effect on
consumers. Lenders and servicers making the foreclosure decision have significant discretion over which households face foreclosure rather than less
costly alternatives like forbearance. The detailed data used in this Article show
that 40% of borrowers who fell behind on their mortgage between 2000 and
2008 avoided foreclosure, largely due to the exercise of discretion by creditors. 21 Moreover, this Article is the first to show that a stark difference exists
between creditors’ treatment of borrowers in wealthy neighborhoods relative
to those in poorer ones. 22 Loans in high-income neighborhoods are nearly
10% more likely to avoid foreclosure than identical loans in lower-income
neighborhoods. The real impacts of foreclosure are widespread—uprooting
families, destroying economic value, and negatively impacting communities. 23
Given the high cost of foreclosures, inequality in mortgage performance gives
rise to $513 million in losses per year to poor neighborhoods that rich neighborhoods avoid. 24 Unequal treatment during foreclosure can also sow distrust
of servicers that lowers the value of mortgages and creates economic waste.
The Article explains how existing legal regimes and economic incentives
are powerless to scrutinize and discipline this type of inequality. Contracting

the original creditor. Debt Collection FAQs, FTC (May 2021), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/debt-collection-faqs [perma.cc/SA4Q-RJ5J].
19. See Jeff Ostrowski, Why the Coming Foreclosure Crisis Will Look Nothing Like the
Last One, BANKRATE (Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.bankrate.com/mortgages/foreclosures-crisiswont-look-like-great-recession [perma.cc/6TW5-765C].
20. The average mortgage borrower experiences a drop of about 150 points in their credit
score once foreclosure proceedings beign. Kenneth P. Brevoort & Cheryl R. Cooper, Foreclosure’s Wake: The Credit Experiences of Individuals Following Foreclosure, 41 REAL EST. ECON.
747, 760 (2013).
21. See infra Section III.A.1.
22. See infra Section III.A.2.
23. Households, and particularly children, are strongly impacted by foreclosure. See Vicki
Been et al., Does Losing Your Home Mean Losing Your School? Effects of Foreclosures on the
School Mobility of Children, 41 REG’L SCI. & URB. ECON. 407 (2011); Dan Immergluck & Geoff
Smith, The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Neighborhood Crime, 21 HOUS.
STUD. 851 (2006); Scott Fay, Erik Hurst & Michelle J. White, The Household Bankruptcy Decision, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 706 (2002). Both the physical and mental health of households facing
foreclosure dropped during the 2008 financial crisis. See Janet Currie & Erdal Tekin, Is There a
Link Between Foreclosure and Health?, AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y, Feb. 2015, at 63; K.A.
McLaughlin et al., Home Foreclosure and Risk of Psychiatric Morbidity During the Recent Financial Crisis, 42 PSYCH. MED. 1441 (2012).
24. See infra Section III.B.
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parties have no legal obligation to behave cooperatively with their counterparties as long as they do not breach the contract’s formal terms 25 or the common
law duty of good faith. 26 Regulators have become more involved in scrutinizing contractual relationships over time, but their power has been tilted toward
rulemaking and away from enforcement. The result is that parties’ utilization
of contract terms are primarily governed by extralegal forces such as market
competition. 27 Contract law scholars have argued that economic incentives
are sufficient to encourage parties to behave cooperatively, with no additional
legal oversight needed. 28 This Article argues, however, that private economic
incentives are insufficient in many cases to avoid harmful contractual inequality if transaction costs limit market efficiency. 29 Moreover, the private market
cannot remedy existing social inequalities, which can occur when there is unequal bargaining power across contracts. For instance, when the same creditor
lends to two debtors, one with high reputational influence and the other with
little power to influence others, no private market force can prevent the creditor from treating the more powerful debtor better than the less powerful
debtor. Private markets cannot discipline inequality without complementary
legal mechanisms. 30
This Article argues that lawmakers must intervene to bring contractual
inequality to the attention of the public. Currently, contracting parties know
nothing about how others in their position are treated during performance.

25. See infra Section IV.A.
26. No implied duty in contract law, including the pervasive duty of good faith, has been
regularly interpreted to cover the utilization of well-defined contract rights. See infra Section IV.A.
27. This Article sets aside other social and psychological drivers of the behavior of contracting parties. Culture and behavioral factors contribute significantly to decisionmaking
within households, and firms and may contribute to unequal treatment of different parties. Economic incentives could contradict these behaviors or reinforce them.
28. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 3, at 828; Gillette, supra note 3, at 620.
29. See infra Section IV.B.
30. Wealth and income gaps are commonly used to illustrate economic inequality, which
can act as a comparator for measuring contractual inequality. E.g., Taylor Telford, Income Inequality in America Is the Highest It’s Been Since Census Bureau Started Tracking It, Data Shows,
WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/09/26/income-inequality-america-highest-its-been-since-census-started-tracking-it-data-show [perma.cc/5EZ59A6T]; James B. Davies, Personal Assets from a Global Perspective, UNITED NATIONS UNIV. WORLD
INST. FOR DEV. ECON. RSCH.: WIDERANGLE (2005), https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/personal-assets-global-perspective [perma.cc/T2NG-PVES] (arguing that both wealth and income
must be considered for an accurate picture of economic well-being). Accordingly, income and
wealth redistribution via taxation is a popular approach for reducing economic inequality. See
Orsetta Causa & Mikkel Hermansen, Income Redistribution Through Taxes and Transfers Across
OECD Countries, VOXEU (Mar. 23, 2018), https://voxeu.org/article/income-redistributionthrough-taxes-and-transfers [perma.cc/5VL7-JDK8]; JUSTIN STEIL, STEPHEN MENENDIAN &
SAMIR GAMBHIR, HAAS INST., RESPONDING TO RISING INEQUALITY: POLICY INTERVENTIONS TO
ENSURE OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL 18 (2014), https://belonging.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files
/HaasInstitute_InequalityPolicyBrief_FINALforDISTRO_2.pdf [perma.cc/F5C7-LBYF] (discussing increased tax rates on estates and capital gains as a tool for addressing inequality).
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Regulators can begin to understand and resolve this problem by requiring disclosure of data regarding contract performance to relevant regulatory authorities and to the public. 31 By disclosing the data to sophisticated parties, such
as federal agencies, they can be used to facilitate redistribution and redress the
distributive harms of contractual inequality. 32 Moreover, data disclosure
could provide statistical evidence of inequality in contract performance that
disparately impacts protected classes, opening the door to antidiscrimination
lawsuits. 33 Finally, disclosures to private actors such as information aggregators, private regulators, and insurance companies could help private markets
hold actors accountable for worsening social inequality. 34 Recognizing and
addressing contractual inequality is essential for lawmakers to sustainably
serve the needs of all types of contracting parties.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces contractual inequality
and its potential harms, focusing on negative distributional effects and inefficiency. Part II describes how contract law worsens inequality, including traditional embedded options in contracts such as the exercise of reserved discretion,
waiver, enforcement, modification, renegotiation, and breach. Part III introduces residential mortgage contracts as an empirical setting to demonstrate
the magnitude of inequality in contract outcomes. Part IV lays out the limitations of using existing tools to oversee contractual inequality. Part V suggests
disclosure reforms tailored to minimizing the negative impacts of contract law
on social inequality and maximizing the efficiency of contract markets.
I.

INEQUALITY IN CONTRACT PERFORMANCE

Boilerplate contracts are essential to households’ income, education, and
long-term financial well-being. 35 Contract terms, however, are written in legal
language that ordinary individuals cannot understand. 36 Vanishingly few consumer contracts include negotiated terms; instead, businesses offer exactly

31. See infra Part V.
32. Taxation is widely considered the most efficient way of redistributing income for the
purpose of remedying inequality. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less
Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667–68 (1994).
33. Cf. Bethany A. Corbin, Should I Stay or Should I Go? The Future of Disparate Impact
Liability Under the Fair Housing Act and Implications for the Financial Services Industry, 120
PENN ST. L. REV. 421, 427–29 (2015). Corbin’s article examines disparate impact litigation under
the Fair Housing Act, which was enacted in response to riots spurred by the impact of housing
discrimination. Data disclosure may allow for more proactive, tailored legislative responses.
34. See infra Part V.
35. Many important standardized contracts for households are debt instruments, with
mortgages, credit card agreements, and student loans relying on standardized forms. See, e.g.,
BAR-GILL, supra note 10, at 1–4. Household debt is at an all-time historical high and is continuing to increase. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT
32 (2021) [hereinafter FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT], https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/financial-stability-report-20211108.pdf [perma.cc/S6LF-4WC6].
36. See Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read
the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2014)
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identical contracts to multiple consumers. 37 Even sophisticated parties who
hire big law firms often find that their contract terms are identical to those
used in other transactions. 38 A large fraction of the contract language is taken
from other sources, including previous contracts written for similar transactions, forms drafted by law firms, and recommended language suggested by
professional associations. 39 Written contracts therefore reflect historical custom and the psychology of the drafters more than the relevant details of a particular transaction. 40

(finding that only 0.2% of software shoppers read end-user license agreements for one second
or longer); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Some Realities of Online Contracting, 19 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 11, 12 (2011) (“Like their brick-and-mortar counterparts, online sellers typically offer takeit-or-leave-it standard form contracts.”); Shmuel I. Becher & Uri Benoliel, The Duty to Read the
Unreadable, 60 B.C. L. REV. 2255 (2019) (using linguistic methods to show that contracts are as
difficult to read as academic articles and concluding they exclude the typical consumer); cf. David A. Hoffman, Relational Contracts of Adhesion, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1395, 1403 (2018) (discussing the growth of plain English contracts by big companies intended to improve subjective
consumer understanding).
37. See RADIN, supra note 1, at 7–9 (describing the proliferation of standard form contracts and the inability of consumers to find more favorable terms elsewhere); Bakos et al., supra
note 36, at 1–2 (describing how in “untold billions of commercial transactions,” buyers are “presented with a preprinted form contract . . . with little opportunity to negotiate the terms”).
38. See MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE
TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 6 (2013) (describing the
big law firm business model as one that “relies on herd behavior, fails to provide incentives for
innovation and thus rises and falls on volume-based, cookie-cutter transactions”); Julian
Nyarko, Stickiness and Incomplete Contracts, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3–7 (2021) (finding that even
in the most sophisticated, high-dollar value transactions, big law firms rely on templates that
may not include provisions that would be important to the transaction, such as the lack of
choice-of-forum provision that harmed Sprint in the Sprint-Nextel merger). But cf. Adam B.
Badawi, Scott D. Dyreng, Elisabeth de Fontenay & Robert W. Hills, Contractual Complexity in
Debt Agreements: The Case of EBITDA, SSRN (May 7, 2021), https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3455497
(showing significant personalization in commercial debt clauses defining accounting procedures, intended to strategically improve perceived financial health).
39. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 38, at 10 (noting the “ready availability of prefabricated contracts” in today’s legal practice, resulting in “[f]ar too much of the revealed text [being]
preserved in each new incarnation of the document”); Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written
in “Legalese,” 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 59–60 (2001) (discussing law firm use of forms); Nyarko,
supra note 38, at 1 (finding that “external counsel rely heavily on templates” and that “[t]here is
no evidence to suggest that counsel negotiate over the inclusion of dispute resolution clauses,
nor that law firm templates are revised in response to changes in the costs and benefits of incomplete contracting”); Joseph M. Perillo, Keynote Address, Neutral Standardizing of Contracts,
28 PACE L. REV. 179, 182–85 (2008) (noting the proliferation of standardized contracts drafted
by professional associations in the business-to-business context).
40. See BAR-GILL, supra note 10, at 2–3 (discussing the interaction between market forces
and consumer psychology and noting that “competition forces sellers to exploit the biases and
misperceptions of their customers” in the way they present their contracts); GULATI & SCOTT,
supra note 38, at 33–43 (describing theories of boilerplate stickiness, many of which rely on custom and psychologically biased thinking); Hill, supra note 39, at 61–62, 73–75 (finding that psychological dynamics at play in contract drafting “represent departures from ‘rationality,’ as that
term commonly is used in economics”); Nyarko, supra note 38, at 25 (noting that one explanation for lawyers’ failure to change their templates is that lawyers “may be risk averse and afraid
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Standardized “contracts of adhesion” signed by parties with unequal sophistication, such as a consumer and a firm, have concerned scholars for decades. 41 Because the consumer has relatively little power to negotiate and
understand the contract terms, standard form contracts may contain terms
that are one sided in favor of the firm. If a dispute arises, the more powerful
firm is likely to prevail, ultimately decreasing the value of the contract to the
less powerful consumer. To combat these harms, scholars have argued for
more informed assent, careful drafting procedures, and judicial and regulatory measures to improve the quality of standard form contracts. 42 Regarding
consumer financial contracts in particular, these concerns have spurred the
creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to ensure that
consumers assent to high-quality financial contracts. 43
This Article focuses on a different issue with this market—the performance of standard form contracts. Transactions subject to the same terms
evolve differently during performance as circumstances change, new information becomes available, and parties make decisions. 44 At the completion of
the contract term, decisions made about performance mutate the written contract’s “paper deal” into very different “real deals” for different transactions. 45
Contractual inequality occurs when two similar transactions with similarly
situated parties end with different outcomes due to decisions made during
performance.
Consider the example of two families trying to build their wealth. Each
has a savings account at a local bank, where their paychecks are directly deposited and their bills are automatically paid each month. The system breaks
down when their paychecks are delayed during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Both families are charged an overdraft fee of $225 when their bills are paid

of the unknown scenarios that may unfold if the templates are tampered with, ultimately leading
to a status quo bias”).
41. E.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1173 (1983) (proposing that standard form contracts be held presumptively unenforceable
on the theory that the power imbalance between parties has negative consequences for the integrity of contract law as a whole).
42. E.g., Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law,
66 STAN. L. REV. 545, 579–90 (2014) (proposing that regulators mandate a system of disclosures
that would increase consumer understanding by highlighting unexpected terms and that courts
should only enforce terms that consumers can be expected to understand); BAR-GILL, supra note
10, at 4–5 (arguing for disclosure regulation that would increase consumer ability to make better
choices); Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial
Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1, 68 (2017) (“[C]ourts should be open to arguments that, as a matter
of law, the clause in question has been emptied of meaning and functions as a black hole in the
boilerplate.”); Nyarko, supra note 38, at 74 (arguing that legal education should better prepare
law students to challenge and re-evaluate standard form contracts).
43. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 10.
44. Contract law makes provision for these types of changes with doctrines of excuse,
modification, and others. David V. Snyder, The Law of Contract and the Concept of Change: Public
and Private Attempts to Regulate Modification, Waiver, and Estoppel, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 607.
45. See, e.g., Becher & Zarsky, supra note 4.
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without sufficient funds in the account. 46 At this point, their experiences diverge. The first family waits until the paycheck is deposited and calls the bank
about the overdraft fee. The bank representative explains that they themselves
opted into the overdraft protection program and that the standard fee is
$225. 47 Ultimately, they pay the overdraft fee along with the other bills after
their paycheck is processed. The second family calls the bank and complains
about the charge. By asking to speak with a manager and threatening to post
negative reviews of the bank on social media, they manage to get the overdraft
fee waived. 48 This pattern repeats itself over the course of the pandemic, leaving the first family thousands of dollars poorer than the second.
This example highlights two key features of contractual inequality. First,
the two transactions were largely similar until the overdraft fee was levied,
with identical formal terms in each contract. Therefore, the literature on assent and consumer understanding of contract terms does not shed light on
how and why the two families’ experiences diverged. Second, the divergence
may occur for any reason and need not be driven by animus or intent to harm
the consumer. The second family may simply have had a more aggressive negotiating strategy, have been advised by a lawyer, or have promised the bank
more business if they waived the fee. On the other hand, the bank representative may have been swayed by gender or racial bias. 49 Each of these explanations raises different concerns. Regardless, contractual inequality causes two
types of harms.
First, in common with other settings, unequal treatment may be inherently undesirable. For instance, contractual inequality can worsen existing
disparities across social groups, resulting in regressive redistribution or impermissible disparate impact. Second, unequal treatment generates economic
inefficiency. Individuals who are considering entering into a standardized
contract are aware that once the contract is signed, the company is free to
stringently enforce the contract with them, while other customers are treated
cooperatively and leniently. Consumers therefore may rationally distrust
companies offering standard form contracts, ultimately choosing not to participate in key contracts because the law does not protect them against the risk
of loss during performance. This phenomenon arises due to a commitment
problem inherent to contract law, which does not allow parties to contract out
of waiver, the exercise of discretion, modification, renegotiation, and breach.
Consequently, inequality is particularly harmful in the contracts context. Each
of these harms is discussed in turn below.

46. CFPB, CFPB STUDY OF OVERDRAFT PROGRAMS: A WHITE PAPER OF INITIAL DATA
FINDINGS 23 (2013), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_whitepaper_overdraftpractices.pdf [perma.cc/B8T8-BM9F].
47. Id. at 27–31.
48. Id. at 52.
49. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991).
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A. Regressive Redistribution
Social inequality has grown significantly in the last few decades. 50 Highincome households have seen their income grow at four times the rate of lowincome households in the last twenty years. 51 The large disparity in standards
of living and opportunities for social mobility between rich and poor households was highlighted by the 2009 recession and gave rise to the Occupy Wall
Street movement. 52 Since then, a significant movement among politicians, ac-

50. Piketty & Saez, supra note 6; The 2017 Tax Law and Who It Left Behind: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 116th Cong. 14 (2019) (statement of Elise Gould, Senior
Economist, Economic Policy Institute) (explaining that the difference between incomes of lowerclass and upper-class Americans is consistently increasing); U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFS.,
WORLD SOCIAL REPORT 2020: INEQUALITY IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD, at 3, U.N. Doc.
ST/ESA/372, U.N. Sales No. E.20.IV.1 (2020), https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3847753?ln=en
[perma.cc/GA35-HJQX] (“[I]nequality has increased in most developed countries and in some
middle-income countries . . . since 1990.”); Janet L. Yellen, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Rsrv. Sys., Perspectives on Inequality and Opportunity from the Survey of Consumer Finances 1
(Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/yellen20141017a.pdf
[perma.cc/78D4-YBV4] (“The distribution of income and wealth in the United States has been
widening more or less steadily for several decades, to a greater extent than in most advanced
countries.”). But see Ana Revenga & Meagan Dooley, Is Inequality Really on the Rise?, BROOKINGS
INST. (May 28, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2019/05/28/is-inequality-really-on-the-rise [perma.cc/X3VB-3JKW] (stating that although within-country inequality has increased in nations with advanced economies, total global inequality has declined
since the 1990s as poor countries become wealthier).
51. Higher-income households have an average income that is 8% higher than their analogues twenty years ago, while lower-income households have seen their income increase by less
than 2%. See JULIANA MENASCE HOROWITZ, RUTH IGIELNIK & RAKESH KOCHHAR, PEW RSCH.
CTR., MOST AMERICANS SAY THERE IS TOO MUCH ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN THE U.S., BUT
FEWER THAN HALF CALL IT A TOP PRIORITY 15 (2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/socialtrends/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2020/01/PSDT_01.09.20_economic-inequailty_FULL.pdf
[perma.cc/V549-8KGV].
52. See Emily Stewart, We Are (Still) the 99 Percent, VOX (Apr. 30, 2019, 9:00 AM),
https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/2019/4/23/18284303/occupy-wall-street-bernie-sanders-dsasocialism [perma.cc/QTS7-8RB6]. Occupy Wall Street formed in 2011 as a protest against the
unchecked power of large financial institutions and the economic disparities that this power
perpetuates. About, OCCUPY WALL STREET, http://occupywallst.org/about [perma.cc/FB5AS3ND]; Mattathias Schwartz, Pre-Occupied: The Origins and Future of Occupy Wall Street, NEW
YORKER (Nov. 20, 2011), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/11/28/pre-occupied
[perma.cc/5QB7-YDD3]. As evidenced by its “We Are the 99 Percent” tagline, the movement
was mainly focused on drawing attention to economic inequality and airing the grievances of
nonwealthy Americans, rather than advocating for specific policy changes. Amy Dean, Occupy
Wall Street: A Protest Against a Broken Economic Compact, HARV. INT’L REV., Spring 2012, at
12, 12–13. Although most Occupy Wall Street events dissipated by 2012, the movement brought
economic inequality to the forefront of national conversations and hugely influenced mainstream politics. Stewart, supra (discussing the long-term impact of Occupy Wall Street); Arindrajit Dube & Ethan Kaplan, Occupy Wall Street and the Political Economy of Inequality,
ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, March 2012, at 1, 4–5, https://doi.org/10.1515/1553-3832.1899 (describing
Occupy Wall Street’s influence on public policy).
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tivists, and voters has given a national stage to policy debates directly addressing inequality. 53 The global pandemic of 2020 highlighted how little progress
has been made in remedying inequality, with low-paid essential workers risking their lives to supply the needs of much more affluent at-home workers. 54
Policy remedies have been difficult to find, in part due to the complex sources
of the problem, including long-standing historical factors surrounding race
and communities, systemic failures in public education, and misaligned economic incentives. 55 Most policies targeting inequality have focused on direct
redistribution of wealth from rich to poor, usually through taxes and social
welfare programs. 56

53. Several politicians in the Democratic Party have made reducing social inequality a
prominent component of their platforms. See, e.g., Annie Grayer, Bernie Sanders Releases Tax
Plan to Target Income Inequality, CNN (Sept. 30, 2019, 8:03 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/09
/30/politics/bernie-sanders-tax-plan-income-inequality/index.html [perma.cc/Z9UE-UYEC];
Kevin Breuninger & Tucker Higgins, Elizabeth Warren Proposes ‘Wealth Tax’ on Americans with
More Than $50 Million in Assets, CNBC (Jan. 25, 2019, 9:10 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019
/01/24/elizabeth-warren-to-propose-new-wealth-tax-economic-advisor.html [perma.cc/7BMG44ZU]; Jessica Corbett, ‘A Just Society’: Ocasio-Cortez Unveils Legislative Package to Tackle American Poverty and Inequality, COMMON DREAMS (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.commondreams.org
/news/2019/09/25/just-society-ocasio-cortez-unveils-legislative-package-tackle-american-povertyand [perma.cc/48PS-SGET]; Maggie Astor et al., 6 Takeaways from the Biden-Sanders Joint Task
Force Proposals, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/09/us/politics/biden-sanders-task-force.html [perma.cc/A7TZ-Y3EC] (describing President Biden’s policy proposals aimed at reducing economic and racial inequality).
54. Aaron van Dorn, Rebecca E. Cooney & Miriam L. Sabin, COVID-19 Exacerbating Inequalities in the US, 395 LANCET 1243, 1243 (2020) (describing COVID-19’s disproportionately
large impact on racial minorities and economically disadvantaged communities); Catherine
Thorbecke & Arielle Mitropoulos, ‘Extreme Inequality Was the Preexisting Condition’: How
COVID-19 Widened America’s Wealth Gap, ABC NEWS (June 28, 2020, 11:42 AM), https://
abcnews.go.com/Business/extreme-inequality-preexisting-condition-covid-19-widened-americas/story?id=71401975 [perma.cc/653N-YT87] (illustrating that the coronavirus crisis has resulted in the ultrarich getting richer and the bottom 40% of earners getting poorer).
55. Historical policies that limited lending in certain neighborhoods based on race,
known as redlining, continue to contribute to racial segregation and adversely affect the wealth
of nonwhite neighborhoods. See Amy Scott, Inequality by Design: How Redlining Continues to
Shape Our Economy, MARKETPLACE (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.marketplace.org/2020/04/16
/inequality-by-design-how-redlining-continues-to-shape-our-economy [perma.cc/CY5X-E3U3].
Moreover, children in poor communities have fewer educational opportunities and show diminished academic performance, perpetuating systemic inequalities. EMMA GARCÍA & ELAINE WEISS,
ECON. POL’Y INST., EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITIES AT THE SCHOOL STARTING GATE (2017),
https://files.epi.org/pdf/132500.pdf [perma.cc/3VEW-ABSX]. Finally, minorities and women are
discouraged from pursuing highly paid and skilled work due to discrimination, lack of human
capital, and preference. Chang-Tai Hsieh, Erik Hurst, Charles I. Jones & Peter J. Klenow, The
Allocation of Talent and U.S. Economic Growth, 87 ECONOMETRICA 1439 (2019); see also DANYELLE
SOLOMON, CONNOR MAXWELL & ABRIL CASTRO, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, SYSTEMATIC
INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 1 (2019), https://cf.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/StructuralRacismEconOpp-report.pdf [perma.cc/E358-74QK] (“Eliminating current disparities among Americans will require intentional public policy efforts to
dismantle systematic inequality . . . .”).
56. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 32, at 667.
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Legal scholars have focused on the role of law in the creation and exacerbation of harmful social inequality. 57 Economic, gender, and racial inequality
have been aggravated by differential use of legal tools against social groups.
The criminal justice system, administrative agencies, and other public actors
have been heavily studied by scholars58 and regulated by lawmakers 59 as a
source of social inequality. Public law scholars have a deep interest in the differential understanding of how legal institutions interact differently with the
rich and the poor. 60 Research on access to justice has highlighted that providing the opportunity to litigate may benefit the most powerful to the detriment

57. This discourse typically focuses on the existence of social inequality across various
sociological classes, as well as the growth of economic inequality in recent decades. E.g., THOMAS
PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Harv. Univ.
Press 2014) (2013). Discourse on social inequality has heavily influenced and been influenced by
social movements and significant events like the 2008 financial crisis. See, e.g., Sarah Gaby &
Neal Caren, The Rise of Inequality: How Social Movements Shape Discursive Fields, 21
MOBILIZATION 413, 413–14 (2016) (arguing that political movements such as Occupy Wall
Street have increased public discourse and awareness of social inequality); Leanne S. Giordono,
Michael D. Jones & David W. Rothwell, Social Policy Perspectives on Economic Inequality in
Wealthy Countries, 47 POL’Y STUD. J. S96 (2019) (explaining that the 2008 financial crisis led to
an increased interest in social inequality among public policy scholars).
58. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1682–83 (1975) (studying discretion in administrative decisionmaking and
its effect on interest-group pressures); Robert Heller, Comment, Selective Prosecution and the
Federalization of Criminal Law: The Need for Meaningful Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1329–31 (1997) (discussing the high level of discretion available to
prosecutors and arguing for oversight by judges); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:
MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (10th anniversary ed. 2020) (reframing
disparate impact in the criminal system as a deliberate mechanism for subordinating minority
races by the differential usage of incarceration).
59. Mandatory minimums were originally instituted in response to calls of racial discrimination by judges in the sentencing process:
For decades, racial and other “legally unwarranted” disparities in sentencing have been
the subject of considerable empirical research, which has in turn helped to shape major
policy changes. Most importantly, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and their state counterparts were adopted with the goal of reducing such disparities. In 2005, when the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Booker rendered the formerly mandatory Guidelines
merely advisory, Justice Stevens’s dissent predicted that “[t]he result is certain to be a
return to the same type of sentencing disparities Congress sought to eliminate in 1984.”

Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role
of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 4–5 (2013) (quoting United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 300 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part)). However, mandatory minimums ultimately worsened discrimination by prosecutors. See id. at 71.
60. Constitutional law scholars have argued that socioeconomic class should be a “suspect
classification” under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Disparate Treatment of Race and Class in Constitutional Jurisprudence, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Fall 2009, at 109; Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class
Determinations and the Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 323 (2016). Criminologists have heavily investigated the “criminalization of poverty,” referring to the phenomenon where the inability to pay is
evidence of criminal culpability in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 646 n.12 (2009) (emphasis omitted).
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of the weak. 61 Even differences in contract formation between genders and
racial groups have been studied and litigated as having an impermissible disparate impact on protected classes. 62
Contractual inequality refers to a less-studied disparate impact—differences in value created by contract performance across social groups. 63 Among
consumers subject to the same contract terms, for example, some may consistently be treated well while others are treated poorly. 64 Disparities in contract performance are particularly important to deter and remedy due to
contracts’ essential role in facilitating the exchange of labor for income, the
accumulation of savings, and the purchase of consumer goods, education, investments, and other assets.
Disparities in performance may be particularly harmful if they are regressive. For instance, suppose the bank customer whose overdraft fee was not
waived is Black and poor. The unequal treatment meted out by the bank adds
to the list of obstacles facing poor and Black individuals trying to build
wealth. 65 Since the Black family is part of a protected class, the bank’s conduct
could even violate federal antidiscrimination law. 66 Though bank overdraft
fees have been widely studied and regulated, regulators do not quantitatively
assess how many fees are waived for Black customers relative to others. 67
61. Omri Ben-Shahar, The Paradox of Access Justice, and Its Application to Mandatory
Arbitration, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1755 (2016).
62. For a summary of this literature and litigation, see Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination: A Law and Economics Analysis, 73 TEX. L. REV. 787 (1995).
63. Literature in consumer law, particularly focusing on predatory lending, has created
frameworks for thinking about the distributional implications of contract formation. Existing
work focuses on the formation of contracts that are onerous or abusive, while this Article looks
at contract performance. See, e.g., Abbye Atkinson, Rethinking Credit as Social Provision, 71
STAN. L. REV. 1093, 1154–57 (2019) (describing how private debt supplanted social insurance);
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of
Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1270–98 (2002) (discussing the role of predatory lending in financing home purchases and other large household expenditures).
64. See, e.g., Furth-Matzkin, supra note 4, at 9–10.
65. For an overview of the evidence on the racial wealth gap, see THOMAS SHAPIRO,
TATJANA MESCHEDE & SAM OSORO, INST. ON ASSETS & SOC. POL’Y, THE ROOTS OF THE
WIDENING RACIAL WEALTH GAP: EXPLAINING THE BLACK-WHITE ECONOMIC DIVIDE (2013),
https://heller.brandeis.edu/iere/pdfs/racial-wealth-equity/racial-wealth-gap/roots-wideningracial-wealth-gap.pdf [perma.cc/KGP8-L829].
66. See Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal Reconstruction, Fair
Housing and Lending Law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J. 409 (1998), for a
discussion of disparate impact and the difficulty in proving claims of disparate impact.
67. Another example of this is the generic guidance provided during COVID-19 to waive
overdraft fees. Despite this guidance, many banks profited significantly from overdraft fees
during the pandemic. Bd. of. Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. & Off.
of the Comptroller of the Currency, Joint Statement on CRA Consideration for Activities in
Response to COVID-19 (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.fdic.gov/news/financial-institution-letters/2020/fil20019a.pdf [perma.cc/QUT3-ERQW]; Annie Nova, Banks Will Collect More Than
$30 Billion in Overdraft Fees This Year. Here’s How to Avoid Them, CNBC (Dec. 1, 2020, 5:31
PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/01/banks-will-get-30b-in-overdraft-fees-this-year-hereshow-to-avoid-them-.html [perma.cc/97U9-BEKG].
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It is essential to note that disparate treatment may be economically rational. For instance, the bank could rationally believe that the second family’s
threat to tweet about the company’s behavior would lose them more money
than the lost overdraft fee. Or the bank may have noticed that aggressive overdraft-fee negotiators bring more business to the bank, making it profitable to
keep those customers happy. The bank may not even be aware of the individual’s gender, race, or wealth. The distributive harm remains in this case, however, since there is a disparate impact on underprivileged populations.
Moreover, economic efficiency cannot always justify contractual inequality because even sophisticated parties sometimes make inefficient choices, resulting in arbitrary performance inequalities. 68 A large legal literature has
demonstrated that legal actors making discretionary choices are influenced by
behavioral factors. For example, a famous study found that judges were more
lenient in cases heard early in the day, with leniency dropping significantly
until judges had a lunch break. 69 Increasing discretion awarded to prosecutors
in charging decisions and judges in criminal sentencing led to larger disparities in sentences between Black and white defendants. 70 Individuals are not
the only decisionmakers subject to these inefficient impacts. The literature on
discretion in administrative lawmaking finds evidence that agencies make decisions that are biased in favor of interest groups and lobbies. 71
The legal system is indirectly responsible for distributional harms of contractual inequality because the threat of court enforcement limits parties’ ability to walk away from their contractual obligations. Contracts scholars have
argued that contract law can act as a powerful force for progressive redistribution at formation, including the use of unconscionability and other principles to protect vulnerable contracting parties. 72 However, these doctrines do
not typically extend to contract performance, leading to worsening inequality.

68. Consider, for example, drafting errors in boilerplate. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note
38, at 150.
69. Shai Danziger, Jonathan Levav & Liora Avnaim-Pesso, Extraneous Factors in Judicial
Decisions, 108 PNAS 6889, 6890–92 (2011). Note that the size of the effect was challenged by
Andreas Glöckner, The Irrational Hungry Judge Effect Revisited: Simulations Reveal That the
Magnitude of the Effect Is Overestimated, 11 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 601 (2016).
70. See, e.g., Jon Sorensen & Donald H. Wallace, Prosecutorial Discretion in Seeking
Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparity in the Pretrial Stages of Case Processing in a Midwestern
County, 16 JUST. Q. 559 (1999); Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit
Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795 (2012); Crystal
S. Yang, Free at Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities in Federal Sentencing, 44 J. LEGAL
STUD. 75 (2015).
71. See, e.g., Anthony M. Bertelli & Christian R. Grose, Secretaries of Pork? A New Theory
of Distributive Public Policy, 71 J. POL. 926 (2009) (showing empirical evidence that administrative discretion can result in discretionary redistribution).
72. Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability
Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD.
283 (1995).
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B. Inefficiency of Incomplete Contracts
A more subtle, but potentially more destructive, harm can arise from inequality in contract performance. Parties who anticipate unequal treatment
and fear that they may be in the group that incurs losses due to their counterparty’s decision will expect diminished value from the contract. As a result,
they may face inefficiently high prices. Moreover, the fear of being treated uncooperatively during performance may make already disadvantaged groups
choose to opt out of the market. This chilling effect arises from the fact that
contracts are incomplete, meaning that firms have many options to modify
the performance of contracts, with the decisions made during performance
potentially leading to widespread economic loss. 73
Returning to the example of banking, consider how new bank customers
may behave in light of overdraft fee policies. More than 5% of American
households have no bank account, limiting their access to a variety of financial
benefits such as low-cost checking, direct deposits, and access to fairly priced
loans. 74 Unbanked individuals may hear of stories like the one above and decide that the risk of incurring overdraft fees is high enough that they will only
open a bank account when offered a bonus, despite the hidden costs associated
with these “perks.” 75 Even worse, disadvantaged populations such as Black or
immigrant families may realize that they are less likely to receive waivers and
choose not to open a bank account at all, relying on expensive check-cashing
services. 76 Economically efficient transactions that could have occurred in the
absence of performance inequality are undermined by the possibility that
firms will treat groups unequally.
Note that contract incompleteness causes harm in two ways. First, it can
lead to inefficient pricing and quality in markets for consumer contracts. 77
Exceptional customer service and other hallmarks of high-quality contract
performance cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, rational customers will refuse

73. Contracts do not—and often should not—specify the full set of actions parties should
take in every contingency. See B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 902 (1998). Moreover, parties cannot commit
to taking certain actions, such as avoiding modification upon mutual agreement. Jolls, supra note
7. For empirical studies on this subject, see Patrick Bajari & Steven Tadelis, Incentives Versus
Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts, 32 RAND J. ECON. 387 (2001), and Sarath
Sanga, Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Approach, 34 J.L. ECON & ORG. 650 (2018).
74. See MARK KUTZBACH, ALICIA LLORO & JEFFREY WEINSTEIN, FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP., HOW AMERICA BANKS: HOUSEHOLD USE OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES 12
(2020), https://www.fdic.gov/analysis/household-survey/2019report.pdf [perma.cc/B53V-TLU9].
75. Bonuses are rarely giveaways, and consumers may be hit with back-end fees that cost
more than the bonus provided. See, e.g., Margarette Burnette, Alice Holbrook & Ruth Sarreal,
Bank Sign-Up Bonuses: 5 Things to Look Out For, NERDWALLET (Dec. 13, 2021), https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/banking/5-reasons-ignore-bank-signup-bonuses [perma.cc/3EVR-M7NA].
76. Indeed, Black families are much less likely to participate in the formal financial market than other racial groups. See generally MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY (2017)
(discussing the harms and effects of the racial wealth gap and segregated economy).
77. See Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74, 79 (1979).
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to pay full price for these amenities, and companies will be less likely to provide perks during contract performance. If firms could credibly commit to
cooperating with their customers during breakdown of the relationship, the
transaction would be more valuable. Second, the expectation of uncooperative
behavior from firms can lead the market for consumer contracts to dwindle
in trade volume and even die out in certain markets. 78 Some contracts may
include too much risk for consumers to participate. The harm here arises from
a value-creating trade that did not occur—if the consumer could be assured
of good treatment, they would participate in the market, improving both their
own and their counterparty’s bottom line. Contractual inequality could result
in disadvantaged populations leaving markets for consumer contracts to the
detriment of the entire economy.
Can incompleteness be eliminated by changing contract design? The gap
between formal contracts as drafted and the economic value generated by the
relationship arises from discretion in the hands of contracting parties. Written
contracts do not specify the actions parties should take in every contingency,
instead leaving the contract terms incomplete, waiting to be filled in by the
parties or the courts. Economists have shown that it may be optimal to structure contracts in this way because gaps in a contract’s specification of rights
or obligations can increase the value generated by a contractual relationship
by allowing parties to tailor the contract to unexpected situations that arise
during the contract term. 79 Moreover, parties to a contract can take advantage
of incompleteness to make dynamic adjustments to the contract during the
course of performance. 80 Legal scholarship typically looks to courts to fill these
gaps. 81 However, most incompleteness is resolved by unilateral or joint action
by the parties before courts get involved in contract disputes. 82 How parties
fill these gaps determines the inequality the contract will generate.
Insurance contracts, for instance, are fraught with incompleteness. 83 The
contract may specify the general outlines of coverage, but no contract can
specify every detail of a particular claim. In theory, insurers could offer a con-

78. Id. at 87.
79. See Bernheim & Whinston, supra note 73, at 920.
80. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1990) (explaining the interplay between discretionary
choices within incomplete contracts and the interpretation of formal contract terms).
81. Default rules are typically thought to fill gaps in incomplete contracts, since parties
can contract away from the default. This account has been challenged, however, due to the cost
of contracting away from defaults. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 13; Omri Ben-Shahar & John
A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651 (2006).
82. See, e.g., Bernstein & Volvovsky, supra note 3, at 129–31; Hadfield, supra note 80.
83. E.g., Jean‐Marc Bourgeon & Pierre Picard, Insurance Law and Incomplete Contracts,
51 RAND J. ECON. 1253, 1253 (2020) (“[T]he link between the circumstances of the claim and
the indemnity payment is rarely specified in detail in the insurance contract, and it is often limited to exclusions or force majeure clauses. In other words, more often than not, insurance contracts are incomplete.” (footnote omitted)).
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tract that specified the precise documentation required of every claimant before being paid. The company may still choose to waive those conditions and
pay the claim without full documentation. 84 Therefore, it is both too costly
and likely unappealing to specify the insurer’s course of action in every conceivable scenario. Instead, some discretion is afforded to the parties in the language of the contract. The insurer can decide how exactly to administer
claims, when to pay out, and how much coverage to award in each situation
to fill the gaps in the contract language. 85
Despite technological advances prompting attempts to make fully complete contracts a reality, 86 solving commitment problems once and for all is
not realistic. Mandatory embedded options, such as the option to waive specific provisions, are based on fundamental principles of contract law that underpin centuries of jurisprudence. 87 Moreover, some flexibility in enforcing
contracts is often desirable, despite the risks it introduces. Parties in some
cases prefer to see how circumstances external to the contract evolve before
committing to a course of action. 88 To understand whether incomplete contracts create significant welfare loss, lawmakers and scholars must assess the
extent to which parties use their discretion to modify contract outcomes and
the reasons behind it.
Information about contract performance is hard to find, however, because
courts are generally unwilling or unable to scrutinize these actions. 89 A large
literature has studied the effect of discretionary action in generating disparate
outcomes in other contexts, including administrative law and criminal justice. 90
Affording discretion to contracting parties is different from those contexts because individuals can opt out of contracts but not out of the criminal justice
system or the administrative state. But although unequal treatment within a contract may not raise concerns about coercion, it still raises concerns about economic efficiency. Despite this, inequality is classified as “relational,” meaning that
parties’ discretionary choices are outside the purview of courts and regulators. 91

84. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 3; Becher & Zarsky, supra note 4; FurthMatzkin, supra note 4; Johnston, supra note 4.
85. Scholars have discussed contractual inequality in the insurance context more than in
others, with Schwarcz proposing a similar disclosure remedy to the one in this Article. Daniel
Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of Transparency in Insurance Consumer Protection, 61 UCLA L. REV. 394, 414–20 (2014).
86. See Richard T. Holden & Anup Malani, Can Blockchain Solve the Hold-Up Problem
in Contracts? 20–28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 25833, 2019),
https://doi.org/10.3386/w25833 (proposing that perfect commitment in contracts can be achieved
with blockchain and automated “smart” contracts).
87. See Jolls, supra note 7, at 204.
88. See Bernheim & Whinston, supra note 73, at 903–04.
89. See infra Section IV.A.
90. See supra note 58.
91. See Benjamin E. Hermalin, Avery W. Katz & Richard Craswell, Contract Law, in 1
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 3, 19 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007);
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The common law of contracts also prevents parties from agreeing to limit
contract incompleteness. Mandatory embedded contract options, such as
breach and modification, cause inefficiencies because no party can commit
fully to not breaching or not renegotiating a contract.92 Waiver and the exercise
of discretion are difficult to contract around as well, although some doctrines
exist to discipline their usage. 93 These legal levers are discussed in turn below.
II.

HOW CONTRACT LAW CREATES UNEQUAL OUTCOMES

The common law of contract has long enabled contractual inequality. 94
Consider a typical debtor-creditor relationship in which the debtor is facing
financial pressure. What choices does a debtor have when faced with the possibility that future payments will be difficult to make? The debtor could decide
to prepay in anticipation of financial distress or offer partial payment after
distress occurs in an exercise of discretion. The debtor could also breach and
make no payment at all. Second, what choices does a creditor have if faced
with the possibility that the debtor may be unable to make payments? The
creditor could preemptively offer the debtor a modification of the debt obligations to make it easier for the debtor to make payments. The creditor could
also waive the debtor’s obligation to pay on time, providing a forbearance period to accommodate the debtor’s needs while preserving their rights to collect
on the original agreement.
More broadly, the exercise of reserved discretion, waiver of obligations,
and the decision to breach, modify, enforce, or renegotiate a contract can each
be utilized to generate unequal outcomes from standard form contracts. Empirical studies in economics, finance, and accounting have shown that contractual inequality is widespread in the context of health-insurance contracts,
commercial debt, and household borrowing. 95 This Part uses examples from
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1091
(1981); Bernstein & Volvovsky, supra note 3, at 129–30.
92. See Jolls, supra note7, at 204.
93. The duty of good faith applies to these contract levers. See infra Section IV.A.1.
94. Scott & Triantis, Embedded Options, supra note 12, at 1447–52.
95. E.g., Aviva Aron-Dine, Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein & Mark Cullen, Moral Hazard
in Health Insurance: Do Dynamic Incentives Matter?, 97 REV. ECON. & STAT. 725 (2015) (demonstrating that consumers of health insurance strategically utilize health care depending on the
structure of the health-insurance plan, while satisfying the formal requirements of the contract
terms); Kristopher Gerardi, Kyle F. Herkenhoff, Lee E. Ohanian & Paul S. Willen, Can’t Pay or
Won’t Pay? Unemployment, Negative Equity, and Strategic Default, 31 REV. FIN. STUD. 1098
(2018) (finding that decisions to default on or breach mortgage contracts depend on private experiences of job loss and the value of housing assets, with approximately a third of defaults being
classified as “strategic” or discretionary); Kevin C.W. Chen & K.C. John Wei, Creditors’ Decisions
to Waive Violations of Accounting-Based Debt Covenants, 68 ACCT. REV. 218 (1993) (providing
evidence that financial covenants attached to commercial debt agreements are strategically
waived, to the benefit of firms with higher chances of future success); Michael R. Roberts, The
Role of Dynamic Renegotiation and Asymmetric Information in Financial Contracting, 116 J. FIN.
ECON. 61 (2015) (showing that the average corporate bank loan is renegotiated every nine
months to account for new information).
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this literature to demonstrate the principles of contract law generating performance inequality and their widespread impacts.
A. Exercise of Discretion
A party exercises its discretion when a range of options would satisfy the
requirements of a formal contract and the party can unilaterally choose
among these options. One form of exercising discretion arises when a party
has explicitly reserved the right to make a discretionary choice within the formal contract terms, such as the choice of production amount in an output
contract or the choice to exert efforts in an exclusive dealing contract, or more
generally the type of choice governed by a mandatory common law duty of
good faith. 96 Discretion also exists in the utilization of well-defined formal obligations, such as the choice to enforce a right, as will be discussed below.
A well-studied example of the exercise of discretion arises in the context
of health-insurance contracts. Consumers of health care purchase insurance
plans to smooth their potential expenditures over the contract term. A plan
typically specifies the amount of coverage, comprising a deductible that is paid
out of pocket and partial or complete coverage of expenditures above the deductible amount. Economists have documented that consumers obtain health
care in a way that minimizes their out-of-pocket expenditures. 97 For instance,
it is cheaper to visit the doctor for a checkup at the end of the year, when the
deductible has already been spent and insurance covers additional care, than
waiting until the following January to get a checkup that will require out-ofpocket-payment. It would be entirely within the bounds of the formal contract
to strategically reschedule doctor’s visits to the end of the year. If sophisticated
consumers decide to get more specialist care in years when their spending is
already high, the insurance company bears the cost and no contract term can
be used to deny the claim. This generates inequality among insurance companies. Companies whose sophisticated consumers strategically reschedule their
health care consumption will have to pay out more, while companies with unsophisticated consumers will pay out less. 98
Note that the inequality in this example arises directly from the incompleteness of the insurance contract. Insurance companies could require their
customers to provide documentation that doctor’s visits were scheduled in a

96. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that “[e]very contract imposes upon
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). Likewise, the Uniform
Commercial Code “imposes an obligation of good faith in [every contract’s] performance and
enforcement.” U.C.C. § 1-304 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019).
97. See Aron-Dine et al., supra note 95, at 725, 737; Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein, Moral
Hazard in Health Insurance: What We Know and How We Know It, 16 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 957,
958–60 (2018).
98. Indeed, insurance companies anticipate this behavior and attempt to find customers
without strategic consumption patterns. Liran Einav et al., Selection on Moral Hazard in Health
Insurance, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 178 (2013).
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timely fashion or could ration discretionary medical care to limit strategic
consumption. Instead, insurance companies have taken another tactic for limiting the cost of inequality—they set premiums to compensate for the possibility of strategic health care consumption. 99 Parties bargain for and assent to
agreements that leave discretion in their hands, explicitly allowing for unequal
outcomes to arise.
B. Breach of Contract
Parties to a contract can always choose to breach their obligations to their
counterparty. The option to breach is embedded in every contract and comes
with the implicit cost of damages or other restitution from the harmed
party. 100 Breach-of-contract claims require no showing of fault and therefore
impose strict liability on a breaching party. 101 This can be thought of as putting
a “price” on breach. When two sets of parties are engaged in similar contracts,
the strategic choice by one party to breach while its analogue continues to perform generates contractual inequality.
The strategic choice to breach has been studied by economists and lawmakers in the context of mortgage default. The decision to stop making payments on a mortgage constitutes breach—the terms of all mortgage contracts
require mortgagees to make timely payments. 102 Occasionally, default is unavoidable, with the mortgagee facing a liquidity crisis that makes payment impossible. On the other hand, some may decide to breach despite being able to
perform if necessary. This is referred to as strategic default. 103 Mortgagees
would rationally prefer to default if the value of their home drops so low that
they no longer have any equity interest in the home, that is, if the mortgage is
underwater. In this case, further payments toward a principal amount that is
too high would be wasted. Moreover, failing to pay would force the creditor
or servicer to choose whether to foreclose on the property. If the loan is underwater, foreclosure may not make the creditor whole. By strategically defaulting, a mortgagee may benefit by remaining in the house without payment
99. See id. at 214–15.
100. Since Holmes, breach has been thought of as a valid, if not ideal, choice to be made
by parties to the contract. See O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462
(1897) (“The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else.”). Recent scholarship in law and economics has
sought to separate the moral requirements of contracts from the economic requirements, holding breach to be potentially efficient. For a history and an attempt at reconciliation of the economic and moral views of breach, see Richard R.W. Brooks, Essay, The Efficient Performance
Hypothesis, 116 YALE L.J. 568 (2006).
101. For a review of the history of strict liability for breach of contract, as distinguished
from fault regimes in tort, see Robert E. Scott, In (Partial) Defense of Strict Liability in Contract,
107 MICH. L. REV. 1381 (2009).
102. See Gerardi et al., supra note 95.
103. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Breaching the Mortgage Contract: The Behavioral Economics of
Strategic Default, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1547 (2011) (summarizing the literature on strategic default
and concluding that changing social norms encourage strategic mortgagee decisionmaking).
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until the home’s value increases. On the other hand, strategic defaults are considered both morally dubious and potentially harmful to the value of neighboring properties and communities. 104
The choice to breach, therefore, generates inequality across creditors, investors, and servicers. Some are lucky to have a portfolio of high-performing
loans without many defaults at all. Others are faced with many defaults, resulting in poor performance and low returns. Despite this, the reasoning behind the choice to default is not considered by courts or regulators. 105
Damages are equivalent whether or not the breach was strategic, even though
creditors with more strategic defaulters face larger losses. 106 Since the option
to breach a contract cannot be modified by agreement, this lever is embedded
in every single contract and can always result in unequal outcomes. 107
C. Waiver and Enforcement
When a contract imposes obligations on one party, the counterparty is
empowered to waive those obligations. Waiver is a unilateral decision not to
enforce a legal right, usually a right explicitly authorized by the written contract. 108 The exact nature of waiver is highly litigated and debated, since an
offer to waive an obligation may be retracted at any time as long as compliance
with the obligation is still possible. 109 The party entitled to waive the other’s
performance is also empowered to insist on performance. Therefore, the
choice to enforce is the opposite of the choice to waive. 110 There is no legal

104. Michael G. Bradley, Amy Crews Cutts & Wei Liu, Strategic Mortgage Default: The
Effect of Neighborhood Factors, 43 REAL EST. ECON. 271, 273 (2015) (finding that strategic default
is “contagious” in neighborhoods, leading to higher aggregate financial risks); Luigi Guiso, Paola
Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, The Determinants of Attitudes Toward Strategic Default on Mortgages,
68 J. FIN. 1473, 1498–1502 (2013) (showing that homeowners prefer not to default on underwater mortgages when they believe they have a moral obligation to perform on their contract);
Michael J. Seiler, Understanding the Far-Reaching Societal Impact of Strategic Mortgage Default,
22 J. REAL EST. LITERATURE 205 (2014) (noting the spillover effects of strategic default on the
financial sector, neighborhood welfare, and other economic sectors).
105. The choice to stop paying is one of the many options embedded in contracts that are
not interrogated by courts. In the mortgage example, strategic default may not work in states
where the borrower can be sued for a “deficiency judgement” that compensates the lender if the
house price is below the unpaid loan amount. However, if there is no deficiency judgement available in a state, there is no legal requirement that a borrower in default be unable to make a payment on the property. See, e.g., Christopher Combs, Strategic Defaults Are Not “Illegal,” COMBS
L. GRP. (Sept. 26, 2012), https://combslawgroup.com/strategic-defaults-are-not-illegal [perma.cc
/SU9S-KLBR].
106. See, e.g., Christopher Mayer, Edward Morrison, Tomasz Piskorski & Arpit Gupta,
Mortgage Modification and Strategic Behavior: Evidence from a Legal Settlement with Countrywide, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 2830 (2014).
107. See Jolls, supra note 7 (discussing the commitment problems arising from contracts
always being modifiable).
108. Snyder, supra note 44, at 625–26.
109. Id. at 630.
110. Id.
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obligation for contracting parties to enforce their legal rights by filing a lawsuit, but they may choose to do so unilaterally. 111 Waiver and enforcement can
create inequality across counterparties—the same party can offer a waiver to
counterparty A while enforcing the original terms of the agreement against
counterparty B.
A large literature in finance and accounting has studied how waiver, relative to enforcement, generates unequal outcomes in the context of commercial debt. 112 Lenders include financial covenants in their debt agreements,
meaning that if a borrower’s financial condition is worse than expected, lenders may terminate the relationship even if the borrower is still making payments. 113 These covenants are often waived, but only for those borrowers who
are likely to have continued future value. 114 Covenant violations that are not
waived have significant consequences, including inability to obtain follow-on
financing and limitations on future investments. 115 Despite this, covenant violations can provide an opportunity for creditors to step in, assert control
rights, and ultimately increase the debtor’s value.
Waiver in this context generates inequality between debtors whose violations are waived and those whose violations are not. These disparities occur
among sophisticated parties, who can change the price of debt to account for
the possibility of covenant violations, following the pattern of insurance companies and mortgage lenders mentioned above. 116 On the other hand, less informed parties are often at the receiving end of differential waiver policies. 117
Recent experimental evidence shows that customers wishing to make retail
returns despite violating the technical requirements of the store’s written return policy are provided with different waivers by store clerks. 118 In a variety
of contexts, then, waivers give rise to unequal outcomes across parties that are
otherwise similar.
D. Modification and Renegotiation
Contract modifications arise whenever the rights or obligations laid down
in the express contract are changed to accommodate new and different circumstances facing the parties. Valid modifications, which are usually written,
111. Id. at 632.
112. See, e.g., Chen & Wei, supra note 95.
113. See id. at 221–22.
114. Id. at 219–22.
115. Greg Nini, David C. Smith & Amir Sufi, Creditor Control Rights and Firm Investment
Policy, 92 J. FIN. ECON. 400 (2009) (showing empirical evidence that while violations of debt
covenants lower firms’ opportunities for future investment, they also increase firm value due to
increased control from the creditor).
116. See Michael Bradley & Michael R. Roberts, The Structure and Pricing of Corporate Debt
Covenants, 5 Q.J. FIN., no. 2, June 2015, art. 1550001, https://doi.org/10.1142/S2010139215500019.
117. Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 3, at 833–34 (discussing hotel checkout policies);
Furth-Matzkin, supra note 4 (addressing retail return policies).
118. Furth-Matzkin, supra note 4.

March 2022]

Contractual Inequality

849

preserve the fundamentals of the contract in a way that is mutually agreed
upon by the parties while changing some terms. Since both parties must assent
to a modification, it has a fundamentally different character than the onesided tools available to contracting parties. On the other hand, the ability of
one party to “hold up” its counterparty and strategically demand a modification, as well as the proliferation of unilateral modification clauses, has turned
this bilateral tool into an increasingly unilateral one. 119 The hold-up problem
has led to limitations being placed on modifications, primarily in the form of
bilateral agreements due to changed circumstances or unilateral changes by
prior agreement including notice and opportunity to review the changes.
Despite these limitations, modifications continue to be a regular part of
many contractual relationships, with unilateral modification clauses becoming increasingly common. 120 Yet scholars and lawmakers have noted that
modification does not happen in cases when it would be socially optimal, such
as during the financial crisis of 2008 when homeowners were foreclosed on
instead of being offered modifications. 121 The federal government created the
Home Affordable Modification Program in response, which subsidized lenders who offered streamlined modifications to their borrowers. 122 The effect of
this program was much smaller than anticipated, and research has shown that
this lack of modification caused inefficiently high levels of foreclosure during
and after the crisis. 123
Unlike modification, which doesn’t replace the original contract, renegotiation creates an entirely new contract between two parties who contracted
previously. As it is never unilateral, renegotiation is a more mutual tool. However, the choice not to renegotiate, just like the choice not to modify, is unilateral. Recent studies have shown that private credit agreements are regularly

119. See Daniel A. Graham & Ellen R. Peirce, Contract Modification: An Economic Analysis
of the Hold-Up Game, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1989, at 9; Steven Shavell, Contractual
Holdup and Legal Intervention, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (2007).
120. See, e.g., David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral
Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605 (2010); Shmuel I. Becher & Uri Benoliel, Sneak In Contracts,
55 GA. L. REV. 657 (2021).
121. See infra text accompanying notes 165–166; DIANE E. THOMPSON, NAT’L CONSUMER
L. CTR., WHY SERVICERS FORECLOSE WHEN THEY SHOULD MODIFY AND OTHER PUZZLES OF
SERVICER BEHAVIOR (2009), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-servicers-modify.pdf [perma.cc/AM73-9PP5].
122. 12 U.S.C. § 5219.
123. See OFF. OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 97–103 (2015), https://www.sigtarp.gov/sites/sigtarp/files/Quarterly_Reports/July_29_2015_Report_to_Congress.pdf [perma.cc/6364-4UJS];
Sumit Agarwal et al., Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program, 125 J. POL. ECON. 654, 657–58 (2017); see also Renae Merle,
After Helping a Fraction of Homeowners Expected, Obama’s Foreclosure Prevention Program
Is Finally Ending, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2016/12/30/after-helping-a-fraction-of-homeowners-expected-obamas-foreclosureprevention-program-is-finally-ending [perma.cc/SH76-9QHJ].
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modified and renegotiated. 124 Violations of debt covenants, for example, often
trigger renegotiations. 125 Recent research has shown that loan covenant violations and subsequent renegotiations of debt contracts were an important factor in the macroeconomic collapse during the 2008 financial crisis. 126 Selective
failures to modify and renegotiate in a cooperative manner can generate inequality between debtors with a path to performance and those who face inevitable financial loss. Just as in the case of breach and waiver, there is no way
for parties to opt out of modification and renegotiation. Every contract includes the embedded option not to modify or renegotiate, potentially generating unequal outcomes across similarly situated parties.
III. INEQUALITY IN RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
To quantify the impact of contractual inequality, this Article considers
one of the most important types of contracts in the United States—residential
mortgages. Mortgages are the largest and most consequential contracts that a
typical consumer will enter into during their lifetime. American households,
taken together, have $11 trillion in outstanding mortgages. 127 Over 30% of income nationwide is eaten up by housing costs, a large fraction of which are
mortgage payments. 128 The health and efficiency of mortgage markets have
important consequences because they decide where and how households live.
In turn, this contributes to the economic welfare of these households, the education of their children, the political climate of their local community, and
the long-term development of towns and cities. 129

124. Roberts, supra note 95 (noting that renegotiation occurs about every nine months,
accounting for new risks); Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, Renegotiation of Financial Contracts:
Evidence from Private Credit Agreements, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 159 (2009) (noting that 90% of private
credit agreements are renegotiated before maturity).
125. Mitchell Berlin & Loretta J. Mester, Debt Covenants and Renegotiation, 2 J. FIN.
INTERMEDIATION 95 (1992); Nicolae Gârleanu & Jeffrey Zwiebel, Design and Renegotiation of
Debt Covenants, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 749 (2009).
126. Gabriel Chodorow-Reich & Antonio Falato, The Loan Covenant Channel: How Bank
Health Transmits to the Real Economy, 77 J. FIN. 85 (2022).
127. FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, supra note 35, at 28.
128. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD., HARV. UNIV., STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2020,
at 34 (2020), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/reports/files/Harvard_JCHS_The
_State_of_the_Nations_Housing_2020_Report_Revised_120720.pdf [perma.cc/9ZTU-88AB].
129. See Tammy Leonard & James C. Murdoch, The Neighborhood Effects of Foreclosure,
11 J. GEOGRAPHICAL SYS. 317 (2009); Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External Costs of
Foreclosure: The Impact of Single‐Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, 17 HOUS.
POL’Y DEBATE 57 (2006); Creola Johnson, Renters Evicted En Masse: Collateral Damage Arising
from the Subprime Foreclosure Crisis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 975, 984 (2010); William H. Rogers & William Winter, The Impact of Foreclosures on Neighboring Housing Sales, 31 J. REAL EST. RSCH. 455
(2009); W. Scott Frame, Estimating the Effect of Mortgage Foreclosures on Nearby Property Values: A Critical Review of the Literature, 10 ECON. REV. (FED. RSRV. BANK ATLANTA), no. 3, 2010,
https://www.atlantafed.org/-/media/documents/research/publications/economic-review/2010
/vol95no3_frame.pdf [perma.cc/FL4E-XVUY].
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Moreover, mortgage markets underpin a large part of the national economy, as was highlighted during the 2008 financial crisis and the recession that
followed. Government subsidies, both explicitly in the tax code and implicitly
through reinsurance by government-sponsored entities (GSEs), have greatly
expanded the mortgage market and have made high homeownership rates
possible. 130 The large volume of mortgage debt contracts and the large quantity of data collected about them makes them an ideal case study for determining the extent to which contractual inequality arises in standard form contracts.
Given the importance of mortgages to the welfare of American households, lawmakers have given a great deal of thought to the structure and oversight of mortgage debt contracts. 131 A typical mortgage is signed by a lender
and a borrower; the lender promises funds to cover the purchase of a house,
and the borrower promises to repay those funds over time. If the borrower
stops making payments, the lender has the right to recover the property by
utilizing the foreclosure process set out in the contract. The contract terms
include some individually negotiated terms, such as the amount of loan, interest rate, and type of payment structure. In large part, however, the rights
and obligations of the parties are derived from standard form terms that are
common across most mortgages. 132 Moreover, contract formation is subject
to state and federal regulation that further regularizes terms. 133
At first glance, it seems as if mortgages can proceed in one of two ways—
either the borrower makes payments on time and pays off the loan, or else the
lender forecloses on the property. However, a wide variety of alternatives exist
for both borrowers and lenders, leading to many different potential outcomes
arising from the same contract. The first choice is made by the borrower, who
may decide to prepay, pay exactly the required amount, make partial payment,
or fail to pay altogether. In response, the lender has many options that are not
130. Michael S. Carliner, Development of Federal Homeownership “Policy,” 9 HOUS. POL’Y
DEBATE 299 (1998) (describing government policies implicitly and explicitly subsidizing homeownership); Wayne Passmore, The GSE Implicit Subsidy and the Value of Government Ambiguity, 33 REAL EST. ECON. 465, 467 (2005) (quantifying the value of GSE reinsurance and showing
that secondary markets rely heavily on implicit guarantees).
131. A large number of the CFPB’s existing regulations focus on mortgages and real estate
transactions. See Code of Federal Regulations, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/rulespolicy/final-rules/code-federal-regulations [perma.cc/9L5H-KJXH].
132. For standard form mortgages, including those drafted by bar associations, real estate
groups, and GSEs, see, for example, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., FORECLOSURE PREVENTION
COUNSELING app. B at 315 (3d ed. 2013) [perma.cc/5WY7-42TD], and Fannie Mae Legal Documents (New), supra note 2. See also Standard Form Contract for Purchase and Sale of Real Estate,
NYSTATEMLS, https://www.nystatemls.com/documents/forms/NYStateMLS_Draft_Purchase
_Contract.pdf [perma.cc/TM2S-PE6J]; REAL PROP. L. SECTION, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N & COMM.
ON REAL PROP. LAW, BAR OF N.Y.C., RESIDENTIAL CONTRACT OF SALE (2000) [hereinafter
RESIDENTIAL CONTRACT OF SALE], https://www2.nycbar.org/RealEstate/Forms/Residential_Contract_pdf.pdf [perma.cc/5K5V-MTQK].
133. An example is the CFPB’s required “Know Before You Owe” rule. Integrated Mortgage Disclosures Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) and the Truth
In Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 79,730 (Dec. 31, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pt. 1024, 1026).
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restricted by the formal contract terms. 134 The lender can decide whether to
credit partial payments as satisfying the borrower’s obligation, sparing the
borrower from being classified as delinquent. The lender also has the option
to charge or waive late fees. 135 Moreover, the lender can choose whether to
intervene at the first sign of underpayment or to abstain until a serious delinquency develops. Lenders who intervene early can ask why the underpayment
happened and offer modifications or repayment plans to help the borrower
become current again. 136 The wait-and-see approach, on the other hand, is
cheaper and allows the borrower to self-cure by repaying unpaid amounts. 137
If the borrower becomes seriously delinquent, typically meaning 90–120
days without making a payment, the lender gains the right to foreclose on the
property. 138 This does not mean that the lender must foreclose on the property; the lender can once again choose to offer a repayment plan or modify the
contract to help the borrower become current. 139 The borrower can also
choose to sell the property and avoid payment as long as the unpaid principal
is covered by the proceeds of the sale. Finally, the lender can choose not to
foreclose, temporarily waiving the borrower’s obligation to pay in order to retain title. This option, also described as forbearance, was mandated during the
COVID-19 pandemic to ease financial burdens on homeowners during the
economic downturn. 140 In normal economic conditions, a large fraction of
mortgage lenders forbear from foreclosing on delinquent homeowners despite having no legal obligation to do so. 141

134. Prepayment penalties must be specified in the written contract. FREDDIE MAC,
PREPAYMENT PENALTY MORTGAGES 2 (2006) [perma.cc/YQK8-647H].
135. Rocket Mortgage, one of the largest originators of new mortgages, explicitly mentions
this option in their guides to consumers. See Victoria Araj, How to Avoid Mortgage Loan Servicing Fees, ROCKET MORTGAGE (Aug. 16, 2021), https://www.rocketmortgage.com/learn/avoidingservicing-fees [perma.cc/J5BV-UFN8].
136. Id.
137. Servicers often foreclose on mortgages that could be profitably modified or would
benefit from forbearance because their incentives are not aligned with maximizing the value of
the mortgage transaction. THOMPSON, supra note 121, at 129–30.
138. Since the CFPB passed regulations in 2013, all lenders must wait 120 days before foreclosing on a property. 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(f) (2021); I Can’t Make My Mortgage Payments. How
Long Will It Take Before I’ll Face Foreclosure?, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/i-cant-make-my-mortgage-payments-how-long-will-it-take-before-ill-face-foreclosure-en1849 [perma.cc/M9BL-7KKQ] (last updated Sept. 9, 2020).
139. Under current CFPB regulations, lenders must offer loss mitigation options to borrowers if they have a loss mitigation program, but they need not actually make a modification or
offer a repayment plan. 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.39, .41 (2021); see also Agarwal et al., supra note 123.
140. The original mortgage-forbearance action was later superseded by the Center for Disease Control’s order to desist from any housing eviction to limit the spread of COVID-19. See
CARES Act Mortgage Forbearance: What You Need to Know, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/coronavirus/mortgage-and-housing-assistance/cares-act-mortgage-forbearancewhat-you-need-know [perma.cc/248U-DXPZ]; Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions to Prevent the Further Spread of COVID-19, 86 Fed. Reg. 16,731 (Mar. 31, 2021).
141. See the empirical analysis infra Section III.A.
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To further complicate the set of possible outcomes from a mortgage contract, lenders often sell the ownership and servicing rights attached to a mortgage. 142 Investors purchase the ownership rights, either at the individual
contract level or through shared pools of mortgages. 143 The servicing rights
for these mortgages are assigned to specialized servicers, who are given the
right to make decisions such as offering modifications, foreclosing, or waiving
obligations. 144 These agreements, part of the process of securitization, both
split up the rights and obligations under the contract and pool the risks of
multiple mortgages together to minimize the risk of default that any one party
bears. 145 By spreading the risk in this way, securitization changes servicers’
incentives to modify, waive, or foreclose in any particular contract.
A. Measuring Mortgage Inequality
To quantify inequality, a dataset is required that follows a pool of contracts with terms that are facially equivalent but actually result in different,
measurable values to each party. Very few sources of such data exist. One intuitive source would be contract disputes, which would include information
about a contract signed by its parties as well as the resulting actions taken. This
data has a well-documented analytical issue, since litigated cases are very rare
and create a biased sample of contracts. 146 Other databases that cover contract
terms exist, but they do not follow parties until performance is complete or
breach occurs, meaning that the value of the contract to each party is unknown.
This Article uses a large commercial database to fill this gap—loan-level
mortgage servicer data. Assembled by Black Knight, this database gathers information from mortgage servicers on the monthly payment status of each
loan over more than twenty years. 147 It also collects details of the mortgage
contract itself, including the structure of the terms, as well as the loan’s status
as delinquent, default, foreclosure, or modified on any given date. 148 Taken
142. See Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REGUL. 1 (2011);
CHRISTOPHER K. ODINET, FORECLOSED: MORTGAGE SERVICING AND THE HIDDEN ARCHITECTURE
OF HOMEOWNERSHIP IN AMERICA (2019).
143. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 142, at 4–6.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. The issue of selection into litigation, often called the Priest-Klein hypothesis, has been
heavily discussed. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
147. Data Solutions and Actionable Analytics, BLACK KNIGHT, https://www.blackknightinc.com/what-we-do/data-services [perma.cc/SA7F-7YMH].
148. Note that this dataset is collected from servicers, who have some discretion in how to
describe delinquency and forbearance. Some servicers may accept partial payment as satisfying
the contract terms, while others may code partial payment as a delinquency. More broadly, forbearance here refers to evidence that a servicer has reported a delinquency but has not foreclosed. There may be repayment plans, late fees, and other payments made that are external to
the mortgage contract itself. These payments are not included unless they are reported to the
data provider. These data are the most comprehensive available but may have some limitations.
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together, the data covers 160 million mortgage loans nationwide and includes
over a hundred contract attributes. 149 Because residential mortgage contracts
vary on relatively few terms, such as size, interest rate, and payment structure,
it is relatively easy to capture the variation in contract terms in quantitative
form. The large size of the dataset makes it possible to find a set of comparable
loans that share the same features. Little variation in formal terms and large
sample sizes distinguish residential mortgage data from other data sources
used in empirical contracts scholarship and provide an ideal setting to test
hypotheses about standard form contracts. 150
The sample for analysis is limited to mortgage performance prior to 2009
to capture the market before the financial crisis of 2008 permanently altered
the regulatory landscape. The resulting sample covers 36.7 million loans originated between 2000 and 2008. 151 Moreover, the analysis focuses on loans that
households fell behind on by at least four months, referred to as the mortgage
being “in default.” Once the loan is in default, the lender or servicer has the
power to decide to foreclose or to pursue an alternative course of action.
Out of the full sample of loans, 6.8%, or just less than 2.5 million loans,
fell into default before 2009. Focusing on this defaulted sample, the first question is how many loans directly move into foreclosure relative to those that
are modified or avoid foreclosure altogether. The second question is whether
lenders and servicers exacerbate existing social inequalities by providing more
benefits and acting more cooperatively in high-income areas.
1.

Foreclosure and Its Alternatives

When a homeowner falls into financial distress and has to stop making
mortgage payments, they are confronted with a very different reality than the
carefully documented process used to originate the mortgage. At the time of
formation, a completely rational and forward-looking borrower knows that
they have a less than 10% chance of missing multiple payments, so they give
little attention to what will happen if they default. 152 Once default occurs, however, the homeowner quickly becomes acquainted with the legal rights and

149. Data Solutions and Actionable Analytics, supra note 147.
150. Typically, contract datasets contain several hundred data points, or perhaps thousands, while the present analysis covers more than a million contracts. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and
Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475
(2009); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, What’s in a Standard Form Contract? An Empirical Analysis
of Software License Agreements, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 677 (2007).
151. The sample selection was intended to avoid the regulations proposed in the 2009 draft
of the Dodd-Frank Act. Note that the author has completed several checks of the data by separately studying the effects year by year and the same effects exist in each time period. Results are
available on request.
152. See Christopher L. Foote & Paul S. Willen, Mortgage-Default Research and the Recent
Foreclosure Crisis, 10 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 59, 60 (2018).
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choices available to the lender (or investor and servicer). 153 Most importantly,
after default occurs, lenders can give borrowers a notice of foreclosure and
then proceed to either take title to the property or sell the property at a foreclosure auction, retaining any gains from this sale as payment to cover the
outstanding debt. 154 Some states authorize the lender to sue the borrower to
recover additional money owed if the sale does not cover the debt in full. 155
On the other hand, if the sale covers more than the amount owed, the lender
must pay back additional gains to the borrower. 156
The inefficiency of this process is that foreclosed properties lose value
quickly. 157 Foreclosed properties are likely to sit vacant and unmaintained for
months or years. 158 Outdoor spaces deteriorate, unused plumbing and wiring
degrade, and abandoned items and other detritus make the property unsightly
and difficult to sell. 159 Vacant properties also attract squatters and criminals,
potentially impacting the neighborhood as a whole. 160 Moreover, sales of foreclosed properties happen at times that are not optimal for the local market and
without a dedicated seller trying to obtain the highest possible price for the
property. 161 As a result, foreclosed properties sell at 30% or more below the
price a seller would have paid in better circumstances. 162 A foreclosed house
in a neighborhood also lowers neighboring properties’ values by 1%. 163 Taken

153. This Part refers to lenders as having the right to make certain decisions, even though
many mortgages are securitized, with servicing rights being assigned to a separate entity that
ultimately makes the decision to foreclose or offer forbearance.
154. Jean Folger, The 6 Phases of Foreclosure, INVESTOPEDIA (June 20, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0510/the-6-phases-of-a-foreclosure.aspx [perma.cc/A95M-LBGL].
155. See, e.g., Combs, supra note 105.
156. ODINET, supra note 142, at 74.
157. See ADAM J. LEVITIN & SUSAN M. WACHTER, THE GREAT AMERICAN HOUSING
BUBBLE 125–27 (2020).
158. Adam Boessen & Alyssa W. Chamberlain, Neighborhood Crime, the Housing Crisis,
and Geographic Space: Disentangling the Consequences of Foreclosure and Vacancy, 39 J. URB.
AFFS. 1122, 1124–26 (2017).
159. See id. at 1123.
160. See id. at 1124.
161. Forced sales depress house prices significantly. See, e.g., John Y. Campbell, Stefano
Giglio & Parag Pathak, Forced Sales and House Prices, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 2108, 2108–09 (2011).
162. Id. at 2117; Sarah Davis, How to Buy a House at Auction: Can You Really Get a Home
for 50% Off?, MONEY UNDER 30 (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.moneyunder30.com/how-buyhouse-at-auction [perma.cc/67YY-FRJ7]; see also LEVITIN & WACHTER, supra note 157, at 6–8, 13.
163. A large literature works to understand the costs of foreclosure for neighborhoods.
Immergluck & Smith, supra note 129; Kristopher Gerardi, Eric Rosenblatt, Paul S. Willen &
Vincent Yao, Foreclosure Externalities: New Evidence, 87 J. URB. ECON. 42, 42 (2015); Elliot
Anenberg & Edward Kung, Estimates of the Size and Source of Price Declines Due to Nearby
Foreclosures, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 2527, 2529 (2014); Zhenguo Lin, Eric Rosenblatt & Vincent
W. Yao, Spillover Effects of Foreclosures on Neighborhood Property Values, 38 J. REAL EST. FIN. &
ECON. 387, 387 (2009). Not only do foreclosures lower nearby property values, they also increase
the odds of default. Sumit Agarwal, Brent W. Ambrose, Souphala Chomsisengphet & Anthony
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together, the pecuniary costs alone of foreclosure are very large, with additional losses due to family displacement, physical and mental health, and community investment. 164
Alternatives to foreclosure, therefore, have been discussed often and in a
variety of contexts. An important alternative is loan modification, which was
elevated to federal policy in 2009 with the Home Affordable Modification Program. 165 Loan modifications offer lower payments for longer periods, restructuring debt to make it more likely that a homeowner can make payments while
living in a home and maintaining its value. Though this process seems like a
win-win for borrowers and lenders, it is not commonly used. 166 As shown in
Figure 1, loans that were in default prior to 2009 were offered loan modifications
in substantial quantities, but the majority (60%) of loans that were four months
behind were not modified despite the potential benefits. However, the failure
to modify obligations does not imply that foreclosure will immediately result.
FIGURE 1: OUTCOMES OF DISTRESSED LOANS IN BLACK KNIGHT DATA

Offered loan
modification :
961,000

Loans originated
2000-2008: 36 .7
mi llion

Loans in default by
2009 : 2.5 mill ion

Loans without
default by 2009:
34.2 million

No loan
modificat ion: 1.49
million

Avoided
foreclosure :
445,000

Foreclosu re:
516,000

Avoided
foreclosure:
612,000

Foreclosure :
877,000

B. Sanders, Thy Neighbor’s Mortgage: Does Living in a Subprime Neighborhood Affect One’s Probability of Default? 40 REAL. EST. ECON. 1, 20 (2012) (finding a 1% increase in foreclosures increases the odds of default by 2.9% for neighboring homes).
164. Costs are estimated to vary anywhere between $26,230 and $77,935 in pecuniary value
alone, with further costs associated with future financial health, child welfare, and neighborhood
value excluded from the calculation. Rebecca Diamond, Adam Guren & Rose Tan, The Effect of
Foreclosures on Homeowners, Tenants, and Landlords (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working
Paper No. 27358, 2020), https://doi.org/10.3386/w27358.
165. Empirical evidence on HAMP suggests that lenders lack sufficient incentive to modify
mortgages, even with subsidies. Agarwal et al., supra note 123, at 695–701; Jean Braucher,
Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons from the Lackluster First Year of the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 727, 772–77 (2010). See generally
Diane E. Thompson, Foreclosing Modifications: How Servicer Incentives Discourage Loan Modifications, 86 WASH. L. REV. 755 (2011).
166. Braucher, supra note 165.
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An important alternative that came to prominence during the COVID-19
pandemic 167 is forbearance—the choice not to exercise the right to foreclose.
Lenders and servicers have no legal obligation to complete the foreclosure
process. Loan forbearance is related to the contract law concept of waiver, with
some courts interpreting long forbearance periods as a waiver of the lender’s
right to foreclose. 168 Without changing the contract terms, lenders who waive
the requirement of on-time payments for several months may ultimately allow
borrowers to live in a home for years without making a payment. Figure 1
shows that regardless of whether a loan is modified, 42% of defaulted loans
never end in foreclosure. 169 Foreclosure, therefore, is not the inevitable result
of borrowers failing to make payments.
2.

Social Inequality in Contract Outcomes

Do differences in contract performance contribute to social inequality?
Servicer data can shed light on this by measuring forbearance rates across
households with different characteristics. One hypothesis is that the discretionary choice to foreclose occurs more often in low-income neighborhoods,
while forbearance is more common in high-income neighborhoods. 170 Similar
disparities are likely to exist across race, gender, level of education, and other
important characteristics. 171

167. Learn About Forbearance, CFPB (Mar. 25, 2021), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/
coronavirus/mortgage-and-housing-assistance/help-for-homeowners/learn-about-forbearance
[perma.cc/B6GY-AEQG].
168. H.K. Lucke, Non-contractual Arrangements for the Modification of Performance: Forbearance, Waiver and Equitable Estoppel, 21 U.W. AUSTL. L. REV. 149, 154, 159, 175 (1991).
169. Following the theory of the drivers of contractual inequality, the choice to avoid foreclosure by the borrower’s counterparty depends heavily on the counterparty’s identity. About
18% of the defaulted loans had their servicing rights transferred at some time during the contract
term. Among the sample of “transferred” loans, more than 90% of the loans were not foreclosed
on. See supra notes 142–145 and accompanying text.
170. This Article remains agnostic about the reason for these disparities. There are several
economic reasons why lenders and servicers would choose to prioritize high-income borrowers
for discretionary good will. For example, they may believe that high-income borrowers are more
likely to be repeat customers, or to be able to harm the reputation of the company if they are
subject to a foreclosure. Indeed, high-income borrowers may be more likely to avail themselves
of legal mechanisms to challenge the foreclosure, leading lenders and servicers to prioritize foreclosures on low-income borrowers. Finally, some research in finance and economics suggests
that delayed foreclosure may not be a benefit to some households, who suffer from the “debt
overhang” problem that results—the household cannot access new sources of credit and are
strangled by their existing debts. See, e.g., Brian T. Melzer, Mortgage Debt Overhang: Reduced
Investment by Homeowners at Risk of Default, 72 J. FIN. 575 (2017). Such households would benefit from selling the property and declaring bankruptcy, if necessary, to get a fresh start on their
finances. Id. at 587.
171. Data used in this analysis show disparities across multiple dimensions that may be of
interest to lawmakers. Results are available from the author upon request.
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Mortgage data matched with census data on income can directly test this
hypothesis. Standard linear regression models can test whether there is a statistical relationship between the two variables, controlling for all other factors
included in the model. 172 Avoiding foreclosure is the dependent variable, and
can be thought of as equivalent to forbearance, or temporary nonenforcement
of the right to foreclose. Reported in the first row of Table 1 is the relationship
between a neighborhood’s mean income and the probability of forbearance.
Since other characteristics of the borrower and the loan are separately included in the regression, the variable labeled “Mean Income > 100k” reflects
the neighborhood, not the individual. The number reported can be interpreted as the difference in forbearance probability for the same individual
when they move from a lower-income to a higher-income neighborhood. The
coefficients of other regressors, such as credit score, separately describe the
likelihood of forbearance varying with credit score or other characteristics.
Table 1 shows these results.
Forbearance is strongly correlated with income. The first row of column
1 shows that high-income neighborhoods have a .033 higher probability of
avoiding foreclosure. To put this number in context, remember that the average individual in a lower-income zip code has a 42% chance of avoiding foreclosure. The regression coefficient tells us that if the same individual moved
to a high-income neighborhood, they would avoid foreclosure 45.3% of the
time. High-income neighborhoods are measured as those with an average income above $100,000 per year, which corresponds to the richest 20% of zip
codes. Another way to state the magnitude of this effect is that neighborhoods
with high incomes are 8% more likely to receive forbearance than lower-income neighborhoods. 173
The following rows of column 1 show the effect of formal contract terms
on the propensity of defaulted loans to avoid foreclosures. A surprisingly robust pattern emerges—most formal terms have little to no impact on the foreclosure decision. Starred regressors, including credit score and loan amount,
have very small magnitudes consistent with a zero effect on foreclosure avoidance. Interest rate and loan-to-value ratio also have no effect. Mortgages with
different structures do have a varying propensity to avoid foreclosure: first
mortgages have a higher foreclosure risk than second mortgages, whereas adjustable-rate mortgages are more likely to end in foreclosure than fixed rate
mortgages. 174
172. Mathematically, the test can be described as follows, where Y1 is a dummy variable for
avoiding foreclosure, z refers to zip code, s refers to state, t to year/month, and l to loan.
𝑌𝑌1 = 𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑧𝑧 + � 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 + Γ𝑠𝑠 + Γ𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙

173. This can be calculated as the difference in probabilities across neighborhoods, divided
by the lower-income neighborhood’s forbearance rate.
174. Adjustable-rate mortgages vary in payments over time and are therefore riskier than
fixed-rate mortgages. Lenders or servicers who prefer to avoid risk in their income streams may
prefer the certain payout from a foreclosure to the uncertain payout from a modification or forbearance.
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TABLE 1: REGRESSION OF FORECLOSURE AVOIDANCE ON CHARACTERISTICS

Mean Income > 100k

(1)

(2)

No Foreclosure

No Foreclosure

0.0332***

0.0284***

(0.00748)

(0.00465)

Property Appreciation

0.361***
(0.0181)

Servicing Transfer

0.603***
(0.0128)

Credit Score
Loan Amount
Interest Rate
Loan-to-Value Ratio
First Mortgage
Adjustable Rate
Constant
State & Time FEs
Observations

-0.000901***

-0.000575***

(0.0000292)

(0.0000401)

+

2.95e-08

1.15e-09+

(1.70e-08)

(7.19e-09)

-0.0771

-0.0731

(0.164)

(0.130)

0.000000669

0.00000118

(0.000000863)

(0.000000998)

-0.215***

-0.202***

(0.0105)

(0.0103)

-0.143***

-0.128***

(0.0173)

(0.0140)

0.871***

0.232***

(0.0225)

(0.0353)

Yes

Yes

2,595,891

2,504,217

Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses
+

p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

To isolate the effect of discretionary forbearance, the regression is run
again with two additional controls. The first regressor controls for the rate of
property appreciation between the mortgage’s origination and the homeowner’s default, measured as an average across the property’s zip code. This
ensures that only homes with similar liquidation values are being compared.
Second, the regression controls for the fraction of loans whose servicing rights
are transferred, leading to principal-agent problems between servicers and
lenders. Controlling for these characteristics can be thought of as comparing
financially equivalent mortgages in rich and poor communities.
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Column 2 presents the results of this comparison. Forbearance patterns
still differ by wealth, with rich neighborhoods avoiding foreclosure 2.8% more
often than poor neighborhoods. Moreover, the regression shows that highly
appreciated homes are more likely to receive forbearance, in contrast with the
expectation that lenders may receive more from the sale of appreciated homes.
Finally, servicing transfers make forbearance more likely, suggesting that foreclosure avoidance is driven in part by the assignment and sale of mortgage
servicing rights.
Figure 2 visually represents the relationship between discretionary
choices and neighborhood income. Comparing the 90th percentile of income
to the 10th shows that a homeowner being in a 10th percentile neighborhood
has 4% less of a chance of avoiding foreclosure than if the same homeowner
lived in a 90th percentile neighborhood. Compared to the average avoidance
rate of just above 40%, this is an increase of almost 10%. Moreover, the very
richest neighborhoods, marked as the 99th percentile here, avoid foreclosure
nearly 50% of the time. As in the literature on economic inequality generally,
the most well-off receive disproportionately large benefits from contractual
inequality, despite being governed by the same contract terms.
FIGURE 2: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCOME AND FORBEARANCE

•

•••

10th

50th
Percentile of Ave rage Income

•

Raw Scatter
95% CI

90th

99th

- - - Fitted Polynomial

The cost of foreclosure is typically estimated to be about $80,000 per
home. 175 Given the 2.5 million borrowers in default in 2009, we can calculate

175.

S. REP. NO. 110-251, at 41 (2007) [hereinafter JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE REPORT].
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the excess losses to low-income neighborhoods driven by differential forbearance rates. Low-income neighborhoods could have benefited by a total of
$5.14 billion if they had received the same forbearance rates as high-income
neighborhoods. 176 This difference means that low-income neighborhoods
faced $572 million in excess losses per year compared to high-income neighborhoods. 177 Different choices made by lenders and servicers during contract
performance generate serious inequities across the same types of individuals
in different neighborhoods.
B. Implications of Mortgage Inequality
The large disparities in outcomes of mortgages in default significantly impact communities. The empirical analysis establishes two important facts.
First, similarly situated households often face very different outcomes when
they stop making payments on their mortgages. Nearly 40% of households in
default manage to avoid foreclosure, though their mortgage servicer has every
right to repossess the collateral. Second, discretion is exercised differentially
in rich and poor neighborhoods. More than $500 million in foreclosure losses
incurred by low-income neighborhoods are avoided by richer neighborhoods
due to the discretionary choices of servicers during contract performance.
Mortgage providers are using their discretion regressively, whether intentionally or unintentionally.
Why are lenders and servicers treating borrowers in rich neighborhoods
better than those in poor neighborhoods? One economically rational reason
for this inequality would be that borrowers in rich neighborhoods are better
credit risks. That is, these borrowers are more likely to pay off their loans, so
naturally the mortgage provider is willing to be more accommodating. This
explanation is unlikely to hold in this setting, however, due to the rich quality
of data used in the analysis. Measures of borrower creditworthiness, including
credit score and debt-to-income ratio, are included in the regression at the
individual level. Conditional on these important indicators of ability to repay,
average neighborhood income is not likely to be informative. Moreover, the
regression controls for the appreciation of house prices in that zip code.
Therefore, it is more likely that servicers are making the decision to extend
forbearance based on qualities correlated with wealth but not directly determining creditworthiness. Examples of such characteristics include time and
176. Using the number from Table 1, the difference in forbearance rates is .033 between
the estimated 2 million defaulted borrowers in lower income neighborhoods and the estimated
500,000 defaulted borrowers in high-income neighborhoods. This is approximated based on the
fact that 20% of homes are in neighborhoods with a mean income higher than $100,000.
177. This estimate is a conservative lower bound of the number used in a 2007 report by
the majority staff of the Joint Economic Committee to estimate the cost of foreclosure during
the subprime crisis. See G. THOMAS KINGSLEY, ROBIN SMITH & DAVID PRICE, URB. INST., THE
IMPACTS OF FORECLOSURES ON FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES 20–21 (2009) (citing JOINT
ECONOMIC COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 175), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files
/publication/30426/411909-The-Impacts-of-Foreclosures-on-Families-and-Communities.PDF
[perma.cc/WSX5-3SWG]; see also Diamond et al., supra note 164.
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skill in negotiating, timeliness of responding to mail notifications, and other
“soft skills” that correlate with social class. 178
Two features of these results should trouble lawmakers. First, regressive
redistribution through contract performance is inherently troubling. Poor
neighborhoods are already less able to bear losses from foreclosures, let alone
disproportionately large losses relative to their richer counterparts. Moreover,
poorer neighborhoods have many other characteristics that raise legal concerns—where mean incomes are lower than $100,000 a year, a larger fraction
of the population is Black than in zip codes with higher mean incomes. 179 Disparate treatment of neighborhoods with different racial characteristics raise
the possibility of actionable disparate impacts under federal laws such as the
Fair Housing Act, the Equal Credit Opportunities Act, and the Constitution’s
Equal Protection Clause. 180 These results may be an argument in favor of more
aggressive redistribution away from wealthy neighborhoods toward poor
neighborhoods, primarily through the tax code but also through public benefits and consumer law. 181
The second cause for concern arising from these results is the possibility
of economic inefficiency due to firms’ use of discretion. Lenders and servicers
can unilaterally decide to delay or avoid enforcing their foreclosure right
against borrowers in default. Borrowers are aware that lenders and servicers
have power during contract performance, and they cannot be sure that discretion will be exercised in their favor. Therefore, borrowers will only enter into
contracts with low enough up-front costs to account for potential losses from
stringent contract enforcement. 182 Borrowers without full understanding of
financial products may therefore be enticed by good “deals” like interest-only
and balloon loans, which decrease payments up front but cause financial catastrophe if anything goes wrong. 183 The result is welfare loss—contracts that
would have been valuable to both parties will not be signed because there is
no mechanism to guarantee a higher payout to borrowers. The total loss to
178. See Johnston, supra note 4.
179. Zip codes with mean incomes less than $100,000 per year have a 14% Black population on average, while zip codes with higher incomes are 6% Black on average.
180. Disparities in modifications, for example, should be actionable under the definition
of “creditor” in 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(e) as anyone who would “extend[], renew[], or continue[] credit”
to a borrower. However, this author is not aware of the statute being used to bring claims on the
basis of disparate-impact data of the sort utilized in this Article. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 66.
181. A long literature in law and economics has shown that redistributive taxation is often
the most efficient way to remedy inequality across social groups. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell,
supra note 32. Cases where redistribution is more efficiently carried out through regulation or
litigation include those where the tax system doesn’t correctly target harmed populations. See
Zachary Liscow, Is Efficiency Biased?, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1649 (2018); Rory Van Loo, Broadening
Consumer Law: Competition, Protection, and Distribution, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211 (2019).
182. This could exacerbate behavioral reasons for consumers to prefer financial contracts
with low payments at first, despite these products causing long-term losses. See, e.g., Bar-Gill &
Warren, supra note 10, at 33–45.
183. See, e.g., Martin C. Seay, Gloria L. Preece & Vincent C. Le, Financial Literacy and the
Use of Interest-Only Mortgages, 28 J. FIN. COUNSELING & PLAN. 168 (2017).
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low-income neighborhoods is likely greater than $572 million because the calculation does not account for welfare loss from incomplete contracts. 184 Moreover, this number does not account for decreases in access to credit for lowincome borrowers. 185
Similar issues plague all the unilateral, discretionary choices both borrowers and lenders make through the course of the mortgage. Borrowers can privately choose to default or make insufficient payments. 186 Lenders and
servicers can choose to modify contractual obligations rather than enforce
their right to foreclosure. 187 Each of these mechanisms can cause both borrowers and lenders to either opt out of the mortgage market due to rational
expectations about their counterparty’s behavior or to enter the market based
on incorrect, overoptimistic expectations. 188 Parties have little scope to contract their way out of these issues due to the standardized nature of contract
drafting and the deep commitment problems that always leave some discretionary choices available to the parties. 189 Taken together, it is likely that this
analysis shows just one of many examples of contractual inequality in the setting of residential mortgages alone.
Similar phenomena are likely occurring in a variety of contracts, including rental and employment contracts. In each case, different norms and regulations may influence contract performance. For instance, mortgage servicers

184. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
185. This mechanism relies on low-income borrowers having rational expectations that
contractual inequality exists, namely that they are less likely to benefit from discretion if they
live in lower-income neighborhoods. Alternatively, if borrowers are not rational and are overoptimistic about the cooperative behavior of their lender or servicer, welfare loss will arise from
too much access to credit, with many borrowers taking on mortgages that ultimately will not
benefit them.
186. Borrowers’ strategic default when default costs are low, such as when property value
drops below unpaid mortgage balance (an underwater mortgage), generates welfare loss because
their use of discretion within an incomplete contract degrades the value of the contract for their
counterparty. See William Adams, Liran Einav & Jonathan Levin, Liquidity Constraints and Imperfect Information in Subprime Lending, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 49 (2009); Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas
Russell, Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing, 90 Q.J. ECON. 651 (1976).
187. See, e.g., Mayer et al., supra note 106 (showing evidence of some modification programs having strategic impacts on lender and servicer incentives).
188. Each of these effects was likely at work around the 2008 financial crisis, with widespread
overoptimism creating the housing bubble and low expectations after the crash causing the collapse
of the private securitization market. See Daniel O. Beltran & Charles P. Thomas, Could Asymmetric Information Alone Have Caused the Collapse of Private-Label Securitization? 4–5 (Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Int’l Fin. Discussion Papers, Working Paper No. 1010, 2010),
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1708242; Manuel Adelino, Antoinette Schoar & Felipe Severino,
Credit Supply and House Prices: Evidence from Mortgage Market Segmentation (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 17832, 2012), https://doi.org/10.3386/w17832; Yueran Ma, Bank
CEO Optimism and the Financial Crisis, SSRN (Dec. 7, 2015), https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2392683.
189. The GSEs, including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, draft form contracts that determine the legal relationship between borrowers and lenders of loans that they repackage and sell.
Modifying these forms could generate legal risk and would require even higher compliance costs
than GSE regulations already impose. See Forrester, supra note 2.
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face different incentives in mortgage markets due to the existence of secondary markets, which pool mortgages and modify the economic relationship between lender and borrower. Landlords and employers may have better
incentives. Nevertheless, every contract is incomplete in some way, and the
embedded options that generate contractual inequality remain the same. 190
Landlords have incentives to differentially waive on-time rent payments depending on their private needs or preferences, while employers can utilize
their discretion to fire or demote employees that they feel are not a good fit
for their company. As long as these tools remain in the hands of one party,
often the more sophisticated one, contract performance has the potential to
generate and exacerbate social inequality.
IV. THE LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING OVERSIGHT
Undesirable inequality in contract performance, like the regressive redistribution documented in Part III, is largely driven by the choices of private
actors. This Part explores the mechanisms available in law and in markets to
limit contractual inequality.
A. The Legal Invisibility of Inequality
Existing tools in contract law that could minimize the negative impacts of
inequality have not been utilized to that end. The common law doctrine naturally suited to overseeing contract performance is the duty of good faith. 191
The duty of good faith is widely considered a mandatory requirement underlying all contractual obligations. 192 However, the legal requirements on a party
acting in good faith do not match the typical layperson’s understanding of the
term “good faith.”193 Instead, courts ask if the parties contemplated the action
taken at the time of formation and if they would have bargained for the action
taken had they contemplated the particular circumstances, even if the action

190. See Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge
That Is Yet to Be Met, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 723 (2008).
191. Daniel Markovits, Good Faith as Contract’s Core Value, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 272, 273–74 (Gregory Klass, George Letsas & Prince Saprai
eds., 2014).
192. Id. at 272–73. This is not universally true. For example, Texas does not extend the
implied duty of good faith to commercial contractual relationships, including the lender-borrower relationship. English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983). Likewise, Pennsylvania
does not impose an implied contractual duty of good faith in the lender-borrower relationship.
Temp-Way Corp. v. Cont’l Bank, 139 B.R. 299, 319–20 (E.D. Pa. 1992), aff’d, 981 F.3d 1248 (3d
Cir. 1992) (mem.).
193. Though the definition has historically referred to “honesty in fact,” recent interpretations have considered an action to be in good faith if it supports the original intent of the parties.
Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94
HARV. L. REV. 369, 371, 377 n.35 (1980); Clayton P. Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of
Good Faith, 1981 DUKE L.J. 619.
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appears uncooperative or stringent to the counterparty. 194 The duty of good
faith requires fairness and honesty in exercising one’s discretion as reserved
explicitly by the contract, but most jurisdictions do not require fairness in the
exercise of contract rights such as waiver, modification, or breach. 195 Moreover, in evaluating whether an action taken during contract performance violated the duty of good faith, most jurisdictions do not consider alternative
actions that were available to the party. 196 That is, an action that was reasonably fair and honest will satisfy the duty even if alternative actions would have
increased the contract’s value. 197 This diverges from the traditional law-andeconomics view of contract law, which posits that the purpose of contract law
is to give incentives for value maximization. 198 Courts do not interpret the
194. The duty of good faith in performance protects parties from taking unfair opportunities within the contract relation by encouraging the parties to “respect freedom of contract and
establish their contractual relations as sites of intrinsically valuable reciprocal recognition.” Markovits, supra note 191, at 272. Even though the parties remain free to renegotiate or rescind their
obligations, the covenant of good faith prevents one party from abusing this freedom to exploit
the other party’s vulnerabilities to renegotiate the terms of the contract for their personal gain.
However, this duty “neither adds to the obligations that contracts impose nor recasts the substantive terms of actual contracts,” but rather “is an attitude that contracting parties might take
to the agreements that they have in actual fact made” based on their original intent to collaborate.
Id.; see also Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Frey, 21 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that when a
contract’s explicit terms do not cover an unforeseen situation, the duty of good faith prevents
one party from taking opportunistic advantage of another against the parties’ original intent and
cooperative venture).
195. Consider Stoney Glen, LLC v. Southern Bank & Trust Co., a case regarding the duty of
good faith as applied to an agreement settling obligations due under a promissory note. 944 F.
Supp. 2d 460, 462–63, 467 (E.D. Va. 2013). In that case, the agreement was expressly conditioned
on the receipt of certain financial disclosures from the plaintiff. In the first set of disclosures, the
plaintiff mistakenly excluded his wife’s holdings, but included them in the second set of disclosures. The plaintiff argued that the defendant violated the duty of good faith by terminating the
settlement agreement in response to the inadvertent nondisclosure. Id. at 462–63. The Stoney
Glen court agreed, noting that “every exercise of a contractual right involves some exercise of
‘discretion’—either in determining whether a right has accrued or in deciding whether to exercise a right that has accrued.” Id. at 467; see also Carma Devs. (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Dev. Cal.,
Inc., 826 P.2d 710, 726 (Cal. 1992) (“The covenant of good faith finds particular application in
situations where one party is invested with a discretionary power affecting the rights of another.
Such power must be exercised in good faith.”). But see Ernie Haire Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
260 F.3d 1285, 1291 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Unless no reasonable party . . . would have made the same
discretionary decision . . . , it seems unlikely that the party’s decision would violate the covenant
of good faith . . . .” (cleaned up) (quoting Sepe v. City of Safety Harbor, 761 So. 2d 1182, 1185
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000))).
196. Scholars have argued that the duty of good faith ought to be broadened to require
cooperative and fair behavior by parties, but this view is not widely adopted. See, e.g., Chunlin
Leonhard, Subprime Mortgages and the Case for Broadening the Duty of Good Faith, 45 U.S.F. L.
REV. 621, 627–28 (2011).
197. Compare ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 279 (6th ed.
2012) (describing courts’ current application of the “bargaining theory” of contracts, which enforces agreements regardless of the equivalent value of the promise), with id. at 283–86 (advocating for an “economic theory” of contracts, which considers multiple buyer and seller
incentives to promote efficient contract enforcement).
198. Hermalin et al., supra note 91, at 21–22.
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duty of good faith as requiring cooperative actions that raise the joint value of
the contract for both parties.
Alternatively, courts could consider evidence of inequalities in performance during disputes over the contract’s interpretation. However, the Restatement and the common law have been hostile to the presentation of
extrinsic evidence about performance in cases when there has been no defect
in assent. The Second Restatement’s language on standardized agreements
succinctly states that contract language is “interpreted wherever reasonable as
treating alike all those similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or
understanding of the standard terms.” 199 If courts were faced with quantitative
evidence that the same contract term generates highly disparate outcomes, it
would no longer be reasonable to treat all parties to standardized contract
terms as similar. 200 But courts have been unwilling to admit evidence that unsophisticated parties are harmed by contract performance while sophisticated
parties have benefited, allowing contractual inequality to flourish.
Finally, regulators have not stepped into the vacuum left by the courts in
overseeing contractual inequality. 201 Consider the role of the CFPB as created
by Dodd-Frank in 2010. Its mandate largely focused on rulemaking, with
some provision for oversight for enforcement purposes. 202 The CFPB’s first
public steps included limiting the type of consumer contracts that were considered enforceable, their terms, and how their formation should be structured. 203 The CFPB acted unilaterally in promulgating its Qualified Mortgage
standards, which caused a significant decrease in risky lending. 204 The results
of this regulatory action could be measured publicly using data from the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. 205 The main steps the CFPB took regarding
contract performance, on the other hand, had to do with debt servicing. For

199. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(2) (AM. L. INST. 1981).
200. This issue is exacerbated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requiring commonality between members of a putative class for a class action to be certified. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
The difficulty of securing certification when the same situation affects members of a putative
class differently has been discussed in the antitrust-litigation setting. See, e.g., Pierre Cremieux,
Ian Simmons & Edward A. Snyder, Proof of Common Impact in Antitrust Litigation: The Value
of Regression Analysis, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 939, 939 (2010).
201. Many of the newest developments in contract law arrived not from common law cases
but from new statutes or regulatory rulemaking that disciplines contractual relationships. See,
e.g., Nicholas J. Johnson, The Statutory UCC: Interpretative License and Duty Under Article 2, 61
CATH. U. L. REV. 1073, 1075 (2012) (describing the UCC’s role in moving from “pure” common
law toward statutory interpretation).
202. See Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 343 (2013).
203. See Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending
Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6407 (Jan. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026).
204. Anthony A. Defusco, Stephanie Johnson & John Mondragon, Regulating Household
Leverage, 87 REV. ECON. STUD. 914, 917–18 (2020).
205. Download HMDA Data, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/
hmda/historic-data [perma.cc/V97C-UQUM].
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instance, after the financial crisis of 2008, servicers were not responsive to customers and failed to credit payments properly, which ultimately led to thousands of preventable foreclosures. 206 The CFPB did regulate servicer behavior
by promulgating Regulations X and Z, 207 and it entered into the national
mortgage servicing settlement with a coalition of state attorneys general. 208
The effects of these regulations cannot be assessed using public data. Instead,
the CFPB is limited to overseeing debt servicing through their supervision and
examination functions only when the political will exists. 209 Ultimately, the
CFPB’s power is tilted toward the oversight of contract formation and away
from scrutiny of contract performance.
Statutes such as the Federal Arbitration Act similarly impact contract formation more than performance. As courts have protected arbitration more
stringently under the Act, contract disputes are increasingly resolved by arbitrators. 210 Parties subject to a mandatory arbitration agreement have less guidance about the types of actions that would fall foul of an arbitrator, since most
arbitration is private and does not rely on other arbitral awards as precedents.
Therefore, once parties sign an agreement with a valid, binding arbitration
clause, they are relatively free from judicial scrutiny during performance. Taken
together, contract law and regulation intervene less often in the performance
of contracts than in their formation, allowing private preferences and incentives
to determine the choices made within the gaps of formal contract terms. 211
B. Limitations of Market Competition
Scholars in consumer and commercial contracts have noted that even in
the absence of legal oversight, private market forces will limit the harms of

206. Michael Calhoun, Lessons from the Financial Crisis: The Central Importance of a
Sustainable, Affordable and Inclusive Housing Market, BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 5, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/lessons-from-the-financial-crisis-the-central-importanceof-a-sustainable-affordable-and-inclusive-housing-market [perma.cc/HM5Q-YSSC].
207. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.1, 1026.1 (2021).
208. What Was the National Mortgage Settlement?, CFPB (May 10, 2017), https://www
.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-was-the-national-mortgage-settlement-en-2071 [perma.cc
/JDZ3-7L7M].
209. CFPB, SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL pt. 1 (2021), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_supervision-and-examination-manual.pdf [perma.cc/7VFVBPCU].
210. This pattern is more pronounced in consumer contracts than business-to-business
contracts, but there are significant numbers in each category. Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P.
Miller & Emily Sherwin, Mandatory Arbitration for Customers but Not for Peers: A Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Non-consumer Contracts, 92 JUDICATURE 118, 121, 123 (2008).
211. Two important counterexamples to this are the Federal Trade Commission Act and
state unfair and deceptive acts and practices (UDAP) laws, which have the potential to target
uncooperative behavior during contract performance and have grown in importance and scope.
Jeffrey P. Naimon & Kirk D. Jensen, The UDAP-ification of Consumer Financial Services Law,
128 BANKING L.J. 22 (2011).
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unequal treatment. 212 One example the literature considers is hotel checkout
policies. 213 Hotels may require on-time checkouts for badly behaved, opportunistic guests but not for well-behaved customers who genuinely need extra
time. 214 This generates inequality across guests, but it comes with an important benefit: hotels have the option to enforce a strict checkout policy and
minimize costs to themselves. Moreover, the hotel will not use this power in
most cases because it would harm the hotel’s reputation to kick out guests who
might review the business on internet forums or recommend that their friends
stay elsewhere. In this way, inequality is not eliminated but instead efficiently
disciplined by the private market. 215
This story is incomplete, however. 216 Most contracts do not occur in the
type of competitive market that can encourage cooperative behavior. 217 First,
competition fails in the face of transaction costs that deprive individuals of
meaningful alternatives outside the contract. For instance, search and switching costs may make it difficult to shop across contracting parties in high-stakes
markets, including the mortgage market. Disaggregated contract rights may
make it costly or impossible to match reputation to a particular firm. Second,
even when a competitive market with few transaction costs exists, it is unlikely
to protect social groups that are already suffering ill effects from social inequality. Low-income parties from minority communities with little bargaining power cannot exert the same competitive pressures as more powerful
parties. Therefore, contract terms that may serve powerful social groups may
not help vulnerable groups and may even harm them. 218 Contractual inequality increases when there is an imbalance in bargaining power across parties to
different contracts, each with the same terms. 219

212. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 3.
213. Id. at 834.
214. Id.
215. See id. at 827–28.
216. See Hermalin et al., supra note 91, at 39 (discussing the limitations of market competitiveness in the context of contracts); Yonathan A. Arbel & Roy Shapira, Theory of the Nudnik:
The Future of Consumer Activism and What We Can Do to Stop It, 73 VAND. L. REV. 929 (2020).
217. One important reason competition may fail is high market concentration that has not
been dealt with through antitrust law. This Article does not discuss this important point, but the
ripple effect of market concentration on areas of law outside antitrust has been discussed in other
contexts. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 1432, 1452 (1985) (noting the different dynamics of imperfectly competitive contract markets).
218. Johnston, supra note 4, at 884.
219. This differs from the traditional definition of unequal bargaining power seen in discussions around one-sided consumer contracts and unconscionability. This Article highlights
inequality across parties facing the same contract terms, as opposed to inequality between the
parties to a single contract.
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Transaction Costs

Every contract is formed in the context of some market. Parties wishing
to enter into a contractual relationship can choose across potential counterparties based on the price and characteristics of the transaction. For instance,
borrowers can choose among mortgage providers and lenders can select borrowers that satisfy their pre-approval requirements. 220 If market participants
base their decisions on their counterparties’ reputations, counterparties will
want to treat market participants well to stay competitive. 221
Transaction costs, however, can dissociate choices from reputations.
First, consider search or switching costs. When looking for a mortgage lender,
for example, a borrower may know the name of their bank and a couple other
highly advertised lenders from TV. 222 To discover the names and prices of
more obscure local lenders, the borrower may have to spend time and money
to search through the phone book or Google, or to ask her friends. Switching
costs make it difficult to move from one contract to another, either by causing
psychological distress or consuming resources. 223 These costs may include the
damages paid to the original counterparty, as well as the types of mental and
logistical costs that prevent consumers from shopping for mortgages to get
the highest returns on their investments. 224 In all of these cases, one party
would feel that the other party is their best hope at obtaining a service or minimizing their costs. Consequently, the party cannot utilize market mechanisms to hold the counterparty accountable for exploitative behavior.
Consider a credit agreement including a unilateral modification clause. If the
credit card company modifies the agreement to include a mandatory arbitration clause, the customer may wish to threaten to switch to another card company if her rights are not restored. 225 But if the customer has to endure a drop
in her credit score to switch to another company, she may well choose not to
switch, leaving the credit card company free to make any changes it wishes.
Second, consider the coordination costs created by a highly diffuse ownership structure to a contract. An important example of this arose during the
financial crisis of 2008, after mortgages had been securitized and sold on a
secondary market. 226 Investors, whose returns depended on good performance, were not in control of the debt collection process. Instead, it was outsourced to servicers through contractual agreements that gave them very

220. See Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 217, at 1445.
221. BAR-GILL, supra note 10, at 28.
222. Alexei Alexandrov & Sergei Koulayev, No Shopping in the U.S. Mortgage Market: Direct and Strategic Effects of Providing Information 20–21 (CFPB Off. of Rsch., Working Paper
No. 2017-01, 2018), https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2948491.
223. Van Loo, supra note 181, at 223–24.
224. Id.
225. Becher & Benoliel, supra note 120, at 667–68.
226. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 142, at 7–8.
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different incentives than those of the investors. 227 Outcomes for mortgagees
varied depending on whether decisionmaking rights were assigned to a separate servicer during the securitization process or retained by the original contracting party. 228 Borrowers often did not know who their servicer was, nor
were they able to choose which servicer would process their payments once
their mortgage was securitized. 229 The result was a very high foreclosure rate
that undermined the financial health of the entire nation. 230 By making it prohibitively costly to connect a counterparty with their earned reputation, coordination costs prevent firms from competing on reputation, leaving their
performance of contracts entirely free from market oversight.
2.

Heterogeneity and Unequal Bargaining Power

The problem of unequal bargaining power has been a longstanding concern in contract law. It is the underpinning of the doctrine of unconscionability, 231 and scholars concerned with one-sided contract terms, like those in
standard form consumer contracts, have debated this issue. Typically, this literature discusses inequalities between counterparties to the same contract,
such as a standard form consumer contract that benefits a large firm with significant bargaining power more than the small individual consumer without
bargaining power. 232 Another important dimension of this issue arises from
unequal bargaining power across similarly situated parties to different, comparable contracts.
Parties to the same exact contract terms may differ widely in their circumstances. For example, terms that allow a secured lender to repossess a borrower’s property upon nonpayment are often identical across loans of the
same type. 233 Whether the property is promptly repossessed, however, depends on the bargaining power of the individual borrower at the time of nonpayment. Some borrowers may be well informed and even litigious. 234 They
can harm the lender’s reputation and drive business away from them; in other
words, they may be able to threaten the lender into leniency. 235 Borrowers with

227. ODINET, supra note 142.
228. Tomasz Piskorski, Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, Securitization and Distressed Loan Renegotiation: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 97 J. FIN. ECON. 369, 371 (2010) (showing that securitized loans were more likely to end in foreclosure, while portfolio loans held by
the lender were more likely to be renegotiated).
229. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 142, at 7.
230. See id.
231. U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019).
232. See sources cited supra note 4.
233. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
234. Some scholars have called these consumers “nudniks.” See, e.g., Arbel & Shapira, supra note 216 (describing the emerging distinction between activist and passive consumers and
the corporate reaction to the informed minority).
235. See id. at 947–48, 965–66.
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small social networks or less information may have no alternative to relying
on the lender’s mercy.
Firms can take advantage of these differences to maximize their reputation while still harming less powerful consumers. In the example above, borrowers who complain the most will be treated cooperatively and given
leniency in repossession, while those with the least power and influence will
be treated poorly. Reputation provides no recourse for unequal treatment if
consumers have unequal influence over a firm’s reputation. Indeed, letting
market incentives discipline firm behavior gives incentives for firms to treat
their customers more unequally during contract performance. 236
V.

STRENGTHENING DISCLOSURE TO DISCIPLINE INEQUALITY

Lawmakers have the power to limit inequality in contract performance in
a variety of ways. However, they must act carefully to avoid perverse consequences that ultimately hurt underprivileged populations. A cautionary tale
arose in criminal law when attempts were made to discipline racial disparities
in sentencing. Mandatory sentencing laws were promulgated in the 1980s and
1990s in part to limit disparate impacts of judicial discretion on communities
of color. 237 Despite this intention, limiting judges’ discretion did not eliminate
disparities—prosecutors continued to treat disadvantaged defendants differently. 238
A similarly naive solution in the context of residential mortgage servicing
would be to limit discretion in lender and servicer behavior in a sweeping,
standardized way. In March 2020, the federal government passed the CARES
Act, which provides relief to debtors having trouble making payments on their
mortgages and student loans. Mortgage borrowers may request forbearance
to delay making payments on their home, and student loan borrowers may
delay payments until at least January 2022. 239 Renters may not be evicted for
nonpayment while the pandemic continues. 240 The debt forbearance offered
during the pandemic is a rare and extreme example of lawmakers intervening
in contract performance. All borrowers who meet regulatory guidelines may
request the same discretionary benefits that were previously provided disproportionately to those in rich neighborhoods, limiting performance inequality.

236. See Becher & Zarsky, supra note 4, at 109.
237. See Starr & Rehavi, supra note 59, at 11.
238. See id. at 13; Joshua B. Fischman & Max M. Schanzenbach, Racial Disparities Under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Role of Judicial Discretion and Mandatory Minimums, 9
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 729, 761 (2012).
239. CFPB, CARES Act Mortgage Forbearance: What You Need to Know, YOUTUBE (Apr.
2, 2020), https://youtu.be/br5EPugsnLs; Coronavirus Info for Students, Borrowers, and Parents,
FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/announcements-events/coronavirus [perma.cc/4BEHC9Y3].
240. See Zach Wichter, CDC Extends Renter Eviction Moratorium to October 3, BANKRATE
(Aug. 3, 2021), https://www.bankrate.com/mortgages/cdc-extends-renter-eviction-moratoriumto-october-3 [perma.cc/KHC6-25PY].
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A short-term ban on the use of legal tools that generate inequality does
not address the long-term harms of unequal outcomes. In the case of the
CARES Act, mortgage inequality will likely begin to grow immediately after
the forbearance period passes. The results may be as negative as those of mandatory minimum sentences—poor communities that have trouble avoiding
foreclosure will be more likely to see widespread foreclosures after the pandemic protections end, while rich communities will be more likely to receive
extended forbearance. Ultimately, the legacy of pandemic mortgage policy
may be a worsened wealth gap between already disparate neighborhoods,
hammered into place by poor households’ distrust of mortgage lenders that
could lead to exit from homeownership altogether.
Instead of directly limiting discretion in performance, this Article proposes a disclosure-based approach that will allow for intervention tailored to
particular contexts. Lawmakers must require contracting parties to disclose
data on contract performance and outcomes, specifically including the legal
levers discussed above: discretionary actions, modification, waiver, enforcement, and renegotiation. 241 The data should be released to regulators, and it
should be available to the public, private enforcement authorities, and information aggregators. Interested parties should be able to get a complete picture
of how contracts are being performed and the effects of performance on social
inequality. More importantly, disclosure can help informed actors distinguish
between disparities that fall afoul of antidiscrimination law, those that are not
illegal but could cause reputational harms, and those that are irrelevant or
even beneficial to social welfare.
How exactly would the process work? It would start with data on contract
terms, including the form contracts that GSEs drafted for mortgages, 242 deposit account agreements that banks disseminate publicly, 243 material contracts filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 244 and
contract characteristics collected in public databases like those mandated by
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). 245
These terms are of great interest, but they are likely to be selectively enforced and otherwise modified once performance begins. Therefore, existing
disclosure requirements should be extended to include consumer outcomes
as well as original contract terms. In the context of mortgage servicing, this
would mean requiring lenders and servicers to disclose the income, race, gender, and other demographic information of those borrowers able to continue
making payments and those facing foreclosure. Moreover, it would include
offers for loan modifications, imposition and waiver of late fees, foreclosure

241. This proposal follows similar proposals in the insurance context. See, e.g., Schwarcz,
supra note 85.
242. See, e.g., Fannie Mae Legal Documents (New), supra note 2.
243. See, e.g., BANK OF AM., DEPOSIT AGREEMENT AND DISCLOSURES (2021), https://www
.bankofamerica.com/salesservices/deposits/resources/deposit-agreements [perma.cc/ES96-VTGF].
244. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(10) (2020).
245. See Download HMDA Data, supra note 205.
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filings, and other records lenders and servicers keep of their interactions with
customers. Combined with data already compiled under HMDA about the
characteristics of the mortgage application and the loan, this would give regulators a comprehensive picture of the mortgagor-mortgagee relationship.
Data collection can be mandated without a significant extension of regulatory power. Many regulators are already authorized to compile data on contract performance. The CFPB, federal banking regulators, and the SEC, as well
as state insurance regulators and other state and local authorities, can promulgate rules and bring enforcement actions when contracts have not satisfied
regulatory requirements. 246 These agencies engage in significant data collection. Returning to the mortgage example, the CFPB took over the collection
and dissemination of HMDA data in 2011. 247 Current guidelines require
mortgage originators to release home mortgage application and origination
information, but loan delinquency, default, and foreclosure data are not released to the public. 248 This oversight means that regulators have more limited
access to data on contract performance and that the public cannot hold regulators and contracting parties accountable for generating disparate impacts.
Implementing this more expansive disclosure regime has several key benefits. First, regulatory bodies like the CFPB would have incentives to replicate
and extend the analysis performed in this Article to study inequality by race,
age, disability, and other characteristics, covering a wider range of important
contracts. The CFPB could not only quantify the losses to disadvantaged communities but could also pass that information to the Treasury Department or
the Office of Management and Budget to consider when evaluating tax changes
and other redistributive social policy. Moreover, the CFPB has the authority
to audit servicers to understand why they treat borrowers unequally. 249
Second, regulatory data on contract performance could streamline incourt disputes that require comparative data. Primarily, disclosing data on
contract performance could expand the ability for regulators and private parties to detect impermissible discrimination and disparate impacts that could
be actionable under antidiscrimination provisions. 250 For instance, if disparities similar to those shown in this Article existed across racial groups, there
may be basis for a discrimination lawsuit. Creative lawyering could generate

246. CFPB, CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION PROCESS OVERVIEW (2017),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/032017_cfpb_examination-process-overview_supervision-and-examination-manual.pdf [perma.cc/7VFV-BPCU] (describing the power of CFPB
examiners to request and analyze confidential information from financial institutions); DIV. OF
EXAMINATIONS, SEC, 2021 EXAMINATIONS PRIORITIES, https://www.sec.gov/files/2021-exampriorities.pdf [perma.cc/B8Z6-HW6Z] (noting that the use of confidential consumer data and
cutting-edge analytics is required for adequate protection of retail investors).
247. History of HMDA, FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATIONS COUNCIL, https://www.ffiec.gov
/hmda/history2.htm [perma.cc/C4EA-JLUD].
248. Id.
249. Servicers could justify their differential treatment of debtors on the basis of business
necessity, insulating them from further liability.
250. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 66.
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other bases for suits alleging disparate treatment by contract parties. For instance, test cases could be filed claiming that highly disparate treatment of
consumers by firms violates state and federal unfair and deceptive acts and
practices statutes. If these are successful, they could remedy any inefficiency
in contract performance by requiring firms to treat their customers equally or
find a compelling justification not to. 251
Third, and perhaps most importantly, disclosure of contract outcomes by
government officials can augment existing private market forces that discipline inequality and inefficiency in contracts. Disclosing data about contractual inequality to private regulatory organizations or well-positioned third
parties can strengthen parties’ private incentives to act efficiently. Search engines and aggregators like Yelp already generate reputational incentives for
cooperative behavior. 252 Regulators concerned about inequality can encourage aggregators to inform potential customers about unequal firms’ performance quality and unequal treatment of disadvantaged populations.
Consumers can then “vote with their dollars” for the companies who match
their values. Alternatively, insurance companies 253 or private regulatory bodies 254 could each intervene to limit inequality. This approach also sidesteps
common criticisms of disclosure policy, as it is aimed at sophisticated parties. 255
Contractual inequality is just one of many sources of inequality in modern
society, but lawmakers have a duty to understand it because it is enabled by the
coercive power of the courts. Moreover, although its impact may be dwarfed
by other forms of inequality, the significant losses created by unequal contract
performance may be remedied with fewer political repercussions. Disclosures
of contract-performance data create transparency and accountability and can

251. When private market oversight fails, the inefficiency created by imperfect information about parties’ actions during performance can be solved by ex post legal oversight. The
threat of litigation ex post can give parties incentives to act cooperatively if both parties have
private information and are able to harm their counterparty. Oliver Gürtler & Matthias Kräkel,
Double-Sided Moral Hazard, Efficiency Wages, and Litigation, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 337 (2010).
252. Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Online Reputation Systems: How to Design One That Does
What You Need, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., Spring 2010, at 33, 34 [perma.cc/P23T-2SCY]; see
Michael Luca, Reviews, Reputation, and Revenue: The Case of Yelp.com 4, 15 (Harvard Bus. Sch.,
Working Paper No. 12-016, 2016), https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1928601.
253. For instance, lenders could offer mortgage borrowers insurance against harsh enforcement of foreclosure rights; the insurance company could guarantee that foreclosure would
not occur within a year of default and could bargain directly with the servicer on behalf of the
borrower to make this happen. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation:
How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 224 (2012).
254. Private regulatory groups, such as the U.S. Green Building Council, have successfully
used certification of high-quality products to align private and public aims. See Alison Gregor,
Aiming for Truly Sustainable Buildings, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com
/2013/11/03/realestate/aiming-for-truly-sustainable-buildings.html [perma.cc/CD9G-46FL]. An
industry group like the Better Business Bureau could do the same for contracting parties.
255. See OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW:
THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 7–8 (2014).
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encourage disadvantaged consumers to enter into banking, mortgage, insurance, and other key contracts, knowing that their experience will be monitored and observed by regulators and the public. Observing and remedying
contractual inequality can provide benefits well beyond redistribution.
CONCLUSION
Contracts empower parties to create high-value relationships and facilitate key transactions. However, not every party is treated equally during contract performance. The same contract terms that can enable the American
Dream or generate profits for one individual can be used to cause loss and
harm to others, depending on how the terms are enforced.
This Article develops a theory of contractual inequality that shows how
legally protected discretion in contract performance causes inequality in contract outcomes. The rights and obligations specified in formal contracts can
be adjusted throughout performance, using tools like waiver, modification,
and the exercise of discretion, as well as the option to breach or renegotiate
the contract. As a result, parties can use their discretion to engage in regressive
redistribution or ultimately cause economic inefficiency by being unable to
commit to treating their counterparties cooperatively.
Using empirical data from a large sample of residential mortgages, this
Article provides novel quantitative evidence that contract performance generates inequality on a large scale through the selective use of foreclosure on
financially distressed homeowners. More than a third of mortgages in default
avoid foreclosure, thereby avoiding some of the ill health, community displacement, and lost wealth that foreclosure brings. Homeowners in rich
neighborhoods are nearly 10% more likely to avoid foreclosure than homeowners in poor neighborhoods despite facing exactly the same formal contract
terms. Given the high cost of foreclosure, this means the richest neighborhoods are gaining $513 million more than poorer neighborhoods each year
from the unchecked decisions of lenders and servicers.
Despite the potentially catastrophic effect on underprivileged parties,
contract law has chosen not to discipline inequality, with years of jurisprudence defanging doctrines that could have played a role in minimizing the
negative effects of inequality. Instead, private markets have been delegated the
important role of overseeing contractual inequality. This Article argues that
economic incentives are insufficient to deter the growth of harmful contractual inequality. Law has an important role to play in uncovering and remedying both the distributive and efficiency harms of inequality.
The Article proposes a disclosure regime to shed light on inequality and
address it in a sustained way. Regulators can obtain data about inequality in
contract performance. By disclosing this data to courts and private actors, they
can incentivize parties to treat their counterparties equally and cooperatively.
By scrutinizing inequalities in the performance of contractual obligations,
lawmakers can foster trust and cooperation and help create both a more equal
and more efficient society.

